THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
OF
PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

VOLUME XIII OCTOBER 1932 PART 4

ORIGINAL PAPERS

THE ACQUISITION OF POWER OVER FIRE

BY

SIGM. FREUD

In one of the notes to my book *Civilization and its Discontents* I mentioned—though only incidentally—the conjecture which might be drawn from psycho-analytical material on the subject of primitive man's acquisition of power over fire. I am led to resume this theme by Albrecht Schaeffer's opposition (*Die Psychoanalytische Bewegung*, Jahrgang II, 1930, p. 201), and by Erlenmeyer's [1] striking citation of the Mongolian law which prohibits urination upon ashes.[2]

Now I conjectured that, in order to possess himself of fire, it was necessary for man to renounce the homosexually tinged desire to extinguish it by a stream of urine. I think that this conjecture can be confirmed by the interpretation of the Greek myth of Prometheus, provided that we bear in mind the distortions to be expected in the transition from fact to the content of a myth. These are of the same nature as and no more strained than those which we recognize every

[1] See this number of the JOURNAL, p. 411.

[2] This refers no doubt to hot ashes from which fire can still be obtained, not to those in which it is wholly extinguished.—The criticism by Lorenz in 'Chaos and Ritus' (*Imago*, XVII, 1931) is based on the assumption that man's subjugation of fire only began at all when he discovered that he could produce it at will by some sort of manipulation. As against this, Dr. J. Hárnik refers me to some remarks by Dr. Richard Lasch (in Georg Buschan's compilation *Illustrierte Völkerkunde*, Stuttgart, 1922, Bd. I, p. 24): 'We may conjecture that the art of *conserving* fire was understood long before that of kindling it; we have evidence of this in the fact that, to-day, the pygmy-like aborigines of the Andamans, though they possess and conserve fire, have no indigenous method of producing it'.

day when we reconstruct from the dreams of our patients the repressed but extremely important experiences of their childhood. The mechanisms employed in such distortion are symbolic representation and the transformation of a given element into its opposite. I should not venture to explain *all* the features of the myth in this fashion ; apart from the original facts, other and later occurrences may well have contributed to its content. At the same time the most striking and important elements are those which can be interpreted analytically, namely, the manner in which Prometheus carried off the fire, the character of his act (an outrage, a robbery, and a betrayal of the gods) and the meaning of his punishment.

Prometheus the Titan, one of the heroes who are still of the race of the gods,[3] perhaps even originally a demi-urge and creator of man, brought to mankind the fire which he stole from the gods hidden in a hollow rod, a fennel-stalk. If we were interpreting a dream, we should readily see in such an object a penis-symbol, though the unusual stress laid on its hollowness might make us hesitate. But what is the connection between this penis-tube and the preservation of fire ? There seems little chance of finding one until we remember the procedure so common in dreams which often conceals their meaning, the process of reversal, the transformation of one element into its opposite, the inversion of the actual relationships. It is not the fire which man harbours in his penis-tube ; on the contrary, it is the means of extinguishing the fire, the water of his stream of urine. A wealth of familiar analytical material links up at once with this relation between fire and water.

Secondly, the acquisition of fire is a crime ; it is accomplished by robbery or theft. This is a constant feature in all the legends about the acquisition of fire ; we find it amongst the most different and remotest peoples, not merely in the Greek myth of Prometheus the Fire-Bringer. Here then must be the essential core of the distorted reminiscence of humanity. But why is the acquisition of fire inseparably connected with the idea of an outrage ? Who is the victim of the injury and betrayal ? The Promethean myth in Hesiod gives us a direct answer to this question ; for, in another story not as such connected with fire, he tells how Prometheus so arranged the sacrifices as to trick Zeus out of his due share, in favour of men. The gods then are the victims of the fraud ! We know that myths bestow upon them

---

[2] Herakles, thereafter, was a demigod, Theseus wholly human.

the gratification of all the lusts which mankind must renounce, as in the familiar case of incest. Speaking in analytical terms, we should say that the instinctual life, the id, is the god who is defrauded when the gratification of extinguishing fires is renounced: a human desire is transformed in the legend into a divine privilege. But the divinity in the story has nothing of the character of a super-ego: it is still the representative of the paramount instinctual life.

The most radical transformation of one element into its opposite is seen in a third feature of the legend, the punishment of the fire-bringer. Prometheus is chained to a rock and every day a vulture feeds on his liver. In the fire-legends of other peoples also a bird plays a part; it must signify something in the story, but for the moment I will not attempt an interpretation. On the other hand, we feel on firm ground when we turn to the question why the liver is selected as the region of punishment. In ancient times the liver was regarded as the seat of all passions and desires; hence, such a punishment as that of Prometheus was the appropriate one for a criminal swayed by instinct, who had committed his offence at the prompting of evil lusts. But the exact opposite applies to the fire-bringer: he had renounced his instinctual desires and had shewn how beneficent and at the same time how essential was such renunciation for the purposes of civilization. Why, indeed, should the legend treat at all as a crime worthy of punishment a deed so beneficial to culture? Well, if we are barely to recognize through all the distortions of the myth that the acquisition of fire necessitated a renunciation of instinct, there is, at any rate, no concealment of the resentment which the hero of civilization inevitably aroused in instinct-ridden humanity. And this is in accordance with what we know and expect. We are aware that the demand for renunciation of instinct, and its enforcement, call forth hostility and aggressive impulses, which only in a later phase of psychic development become transformed into a sense of guilt.

The obscurity of the Prometheus legend and of other fire-myths is increased by the fact that primitive man could not but regard fire as something analogous to the passion of love—we should say, as a symbol of the libido. The warmth radiated by fire evokes the same kind of glow as accompanies the state of sexual excitation, and the form and motion of the flame suggest the phallus in action. There can be no doubt about the mythological significance of flames as the phallus; we have evidence of it even in the story of the origin of the Roman king, Servius Tullius. When we ourselves speak of the

' devouring fire ' of passion, or describe flames as ' licking ' (comparing the flame with a tongue), we have not moved so very far from the thought of our primitive ancestors. Our account of the acquisition of fire presupposed, indeed, that to primal man the attempt to extinguish fire by means of his own water signified a pleasurable struggle with another phallus.

It may thus well be that by way of this symbolical assimilation other, purely phantastic elements have entered into the myth and become intertwined with the historical ones. It is difficult to resist the notion that, if the liver is the seat of passion, its symbolical significance is the same as that of fire itself and that thus its daily consumption and renewal is an apt description of the behaviour of the appetite of love, which, though gratified daily, is daily renewed. The bird which sates itself by feeding on the liver would then signify the penis—a meaning which is in any case by no means foreign to it, as we see in legends, dreams, linguistic usage and the plastic representations of antiquity. A short step further brings us to the phœnix, the bird which, as often as it is consumed by fire, emerges again rejuvenated. Probably the earliest significance of the phœnix was that of the revivified penis after its state of flaccidity, rather than that of the sun setting in the evening glow and then rising again.

One may raise the question whether it seems likely that our mythopœic activities simply essay—as it were in play—to represent in a disguised form universally familiar, even if highly interesting mental processes (with their own physical manifestations), for no other motive than the sheer pleasure of representation. We can assuredly give no certain answer to this question without a full grasp of the nature of myth, but in the two cases we are considering it is easy to recognize the same content, and in virtue of this, a definite trend. They describe the revival of the libidinal desires after they have been sated and extinguished. That is to say, they emphasize the imperishable nature of these desires, and this reassurance is particularly appropriate if the historical core of the myth deals with a defeat of the instinctual life, a renunciation of instinct which has become inevitable. It is, as it were, the second part of the understandable reaction of primitive man to the blow struck at his instinctual life ; after the punishment of the criminal comes the assurance that, after all, he has done nothing irreparable.

We unexpectedly come across another instance of the reversal of an element into its opposite in a different myth which in appearance

has very little to do with the fire-myth. The hydra of Lerna, with its innumerable darting serpent's heads (one of which is immortal), was, according to its name, a water-snake. Herakles, the hero, combats it by cutting off its heads, but they always grow again, and only when he has burnt out the immortal head with fire can he master the monster. A water-serpent subdued by fire—surely that does not make sense. But, as in so many dreams, sense comes if we reverse the manifest content. In that case the hydra is a firebrand, the darting serpents' heads are the flames and, in proof of their libidinal nature, they, like Prometheus' liver, display the phenomenon of growing again, of renewal after attempted destruction. Now Herakles extinguishes this firebrand with—water. (The immortal head is no doubt the phallus itself and its destruction signifies castration.) But Herakles is also the deliverer of Prometheus, and slays the bird which devours his liver. Must we not divine a deeper connection between the two myths? It is as if the action of the one hero were set to rights by the other. Prometheus had forbidden the extinguishing of the fire (like the Mongolian law); Herakles permitted it in the case of the baleful firebrand. The second myth seems to correspond to the reaction of a later epoch of civilization to the circumstances in which power over fire was acquired. One has the impression that this approach might lead us quite a long way into the secrets of the myth, but, of course, we should not carry the feeling of certainty with us very far.

Besides the historical factor and the factor of symbolical phantasy contributing to the antithesis of fire and water, which dominates the entire sphere of these myths, we can point to yet a third, a physiological fact, described by the poet in the following lines:

> 'Was dem Menschen dient zum Seichen,
> Damit schafft er Seinesgleichen.'
>
> (Heine).[4]

The male sexual organ has two functions, whose association is to many a man a source of annoyance. It is the channel for the evacuation of urine, and it performs the sexual act, which appeases the craving of the genital libido. Children still believe that they can combine these two functions; one of their ideas of the way babies are made is that the man urinates into the woman's body. But the adult knows that in reality the two acts are incompatible—as incompatible as fire and water. When the penis passes into that condition

[4] 'With that which serves a man to piss he re-creates his own kind.'

of excitation which has caused it to be compared with a bird, and whilst those sensations are being experienced which suggest the heat of fire, urination is impossible. Conversely, when the penis is fulfilling its function of evacuating urine (the water of the body), all connection with its genital function appears to be extinguished. Having regard to the antithesis of these two functions, we might say that man quenches his own fire with his own water. And we may suppose that primitive man, who had to try to grasp the external world with the help of his own bodily sensations and states, did not fail to observe and apply the analogies presented to him by the behaviour of fire.

NOTE ON FREUD'S HYPOTHESIS REGARDING THE TAMING OF FIRE

BY

E. H. ERLENMEYER

BASLE

In *Civilization and its Discontents* [1] Sigmund Freud puts forward the following hypothesis with reference to the cultural significance of man's acquiring the use of fire :

' Psycho-analytic material, as yet incomplete and not capable of unequivocal interpretation, nevertheless admits of a surmise—which sounds fantastic enough—about the origin of this human feat. It is as if primitive man had had the impulse, when he came in contact with fire, to gratify an infantile pleasure in respect of it and put it out with a stream of urine. The legends that we possess leave no doubt that flames shooting upwards like tongues were originally felt to have a phallic sense. Putting out fire by urinating—which is also introduced in the later fables of Gulliver in Lilliput and Rabelais's Gargantua—therefore represented a sexual act with a man, an enjoyment of masculine potency in homosexual rivalry. Whoever was the first to deny himself this pleasure and spare the fire was able to take it with him and break it in to his own service. By curbing the fire of his own sexual passion he was able to tame fire as a force of nature. This great cultural victory was thus a reward for refraining from gratification of an instinct.'

These notions have not remained undisputed. The most vigorous criticism of them appears in a paper by Albrecht Schaeffer entitled ' Der Mensch und das Feuer,' [2] as follows :

" ' Fantastic sounding ', says Freud apologetically, in describing his hypothesis, and at the very start I must take exception to the word ' fantastic '. I may, I think, be allowed to do so, since the word selected by the man of science is one that comes within my own province. To my mind this conjecture about the circumstances which led to man's mastery of fire cannot possibly be called fantastic ; on the contrary, it is simply devoid of fantasy. A notion, indeed, as entirely lacking in fantasy (i.e. the power to imagine any sort of real conditions or occurrences), turned to such pure theory, as anyone could demand from a man of science ".

---

[1] Footnote, p. 50.

[2] *Psychoanalytische Bewegung*, Jahrgang II, 1930, p. 201.

No doubt Schaeffer's objection is intended to apply not to this particular hypothesis only, but also to the method by which it was arrived at. The construction or fiction of a primal man strikes him as a hazardous one. ' For ', he says, ' what sort of human conditions are we to envisage, what kind of primal epoch must we imagine, what manner of man, and what was the fire which he encountered and succeeded in extinguishing ? '

The fiction of a primal man and a primal horde has, however, a far greater measure of reality than that, say, of the primal plant (*Urpflanze*) conceived of by Goethe. At the same time, of course, it will not always be possible to substantiate by means of historical examples our conjectures about what took place in that primal epoch.

Yet just in this particular instance of primitive man's attitude towards fire we can adduce special historical evidence which to my thinking directly illustrates Freud's thesis.

In the *Jasa*, the code of laws given to the Mongols by Genghis Khan, we find in a catalogue of various crimes the following : that he who urinates into water or upon ashes shall be punished with death. In a book by Hammer-Purgstall,[3] entitled *Geschichte der Goldenen Horde in Kiptschak*, this part of the *Jasa* is reproduced as follows :

' There are fourteen offences which shall be punishable with death. They are, first, adultery, sodomy, theft, murder and, further, lying and witchcraft. Likewise, he shall suffer death who does not return the runaway slave to his master ; he who in a fight or a raid does not gather up and return to his chief the weapon or booty he has let fall ; he who a third time squanders any property entrusted to him ; he who, in a single combat, helps one of the two combatants ; the deserter and the rebel ; he who *pisses in water or upon ashes ;* he who slays beasts after the manner of the Moslems and not of the Mongols.' [4]

In another passage in this book, Hammer-Purgstall points out that this enactment shows an affinity with the prohibitions of the Pythagoreans.[5] ' As the Pythagoreans were forbidden to pass urine facing the sun,[6] so the Mongols were forbidden, under penalty of death, to do so into water or upon ashes.'

---

[3] Hartlebens Verlag, Pesth, 1840, p. 187.

[4] Hammer-Purgstall, p. 50.

[5] P. 191.

[6] *Converso ad solem vultu non mingendum.* Diogenes Laertius: *Pythagoras* XVII.

The peculiarity of these ordinances is also reflected in the manners and customs of this race. 'They cleansed themselves with fire and not with water, for they never washed and even believed that to bathe in the river was to call down lightning from heaven.' And, speaking of lightning, the same writer declares: 'All Mongols feared it excessively: only those of the tribe of Uriangkut would conjure it with magical incantations. In the midst of the most terrific thunderstorms they would revile the thunder and lightning with loud howls'.

These quotations surely indicate that primitive man's relation to fire, to ashes that harbour fire, and to the sun was, in fact, subject to those tensions which Freud postulates in his hypothesis. When Genghis Khan led a small horde of nomads to conquest and to the foundation of the greatest empire the world has ever known, he reckoned amongst the dangerous instincts which must be threatened with the death penalty the passion for extinguishing fire. This shews what importance he attributed to the renunciation of this instinct in the service of progress.

These historical facts furnish a remarkable confirmation of Freud's views on the cultural significance of this renunciation.

JEALOUSY AS A MECHANISM OF DEFENCE

BY

JOAN RIVIERE

LONDON

A type of jealousy which is not referred to in psycho-analytic literature first came under my observation in a marked form in one individual; when it had been elucidated by analysis the now familiar mechanism could be seen, to a minor and hence less noticeable extent, at work in other cases, suggesting some conclusions of general validity.

This morbid jealousy first manifested itself after a period of analysis and might be called a transitory symptom. The patient was a young married woman who came for analysis on account of frigidity in intercourse and certain inhibitions, but hardly of her own accord, though a tendency towards homosexuality perturbed her. There were otherwise no clinical symptoms. The jealousy, when it appeared, related to her husband and his supposed affairs with other women. On grounds of discretion I shall not be able to go into much detail in my material; a discussion of the relation of this affective attitude of hers to external reality would, moreover, be a study in itself and take me too far afield here. I will merely say that at certain times and in certain ways she had grounds for jealous suspicions. The jealousy was also manifested in a transference-relation to myself; e.g. she would fancy hidden in my writing-table letters to me from her husband or some other man she desired.

The patient asserted that she had never felt jealous in her life before these feelings arose during the course of the analysis. It was true that she had not had much grounds for it before marriage, but in relation to her husband she had had as much reason to feel it before the analysis began as later. Her husband was quite the most important figure in her life; so when the jealous feelings arose I surmised that a more normal attitude in this respect was developing, along with a relaxation in other inhibitions. This conclusion was supported for a time by her considerable capacity for rationalization, which misled me. Before long, however, the jealous moods became so acute and often culminated in scenes of such furious recrimination against the husband that I could not doubt its pathological character.

Freud has described two forms of morbid jealousy: the projected and the delusional. Both serve the purpose of defence against the super-ego by projecting the guilt of the subject's own infidelity upon

the partner.[1] Ernest Jones [2], in a paper on jealousy, also describes the projection on to the partner, underlying jealousy, of the subject's own infidelity. He dwells on the value of jealousy as a sign of love, a compensation of hate, and as a reassurance against guilt: the other parties are guilty, not the jealous one. Dealing throughout with jealousy in the man, Jones concludes that jealousy is the result of dependence, which arises from guilt; guilt leads to fear of the father and inversion; inversion leads to fear of the woman, from which flight and infidelity arises; the latter is then projected.

I thus had to consider whether infidelity on my patient's own part could explain the phenomenon in her; but here I met with another difficulty. There was in fact some ground for regarding this as an explanation in a general way; for flirtations, which never became love-affairs or led to full coitus but gave her marked sensual pleasure, did play a part in her life and did cause considerable guilt. But, as seen under the microscope of day-to-day analysis, this general explanation of her jealousy as a projection of her own infidelity was clearly insufficient. For one thing, there was frequently no associative connection in time between the two manifestations. Again, I was constantly struck with the frankness and freedom of her self-condemnation in analysis about her unfaithfulness, and also with the connection I began to perceive in the analysis between her outbursts of confession and guilt on this score and the analytic context. At first, indeed, it was only lack of connection I could detect. She would spend the hour figuratively beating her breast as a miserable sinner precisely whenever we had on the preceding day arrived at some important new light on her unconscious life, quite unconnected with her flirtations. So when this progress in analysis was checked by an hour of futile self-blame on a different topic, one soon saw that guilt about her own infidelity was being used as a cover, a displacement, a device to block the analysis and was in fact a defence. The immediate necessity then of course was to discover the specific associative connection between the foregoing analytic work and the defence against it; in other words, the infidelity itself was susceptible of analysis and required it. But a broad conclusion also forced itself upon one, namely, that if her

---

[1] 'Certain Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia, and Homosexuality,' *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, p. 232.

[2] Published in *Revue française de Psychanalyse*, t. III, pp. 228–242; *Psyche*, Vol. XI, pp. 41–55.

flirtations or her guilt about them could be used as a defence they could hardly be the origin of a projection on to the husband.

In spite of this, however, the form taken by the jealousy was at times so markedly persecutory in character that I felt convinced of some projective mechanism at work in it. If she was not projecting her own infidelity in her jealousy of her husband, then she was certainly projecting something else. And yet I could not overlook certain striking analogies in the nature of both her unfaithful and her jealous moods and acts—something strongly compulsive, uncontrolled and irresistible, alien to her usual character, in both—which suggested a deep and intimate connection between the two.

A few more months elucidated the problem; the persecutory jealousy then gradually subsided and the sensual flirtations were given up, to flicker up later only feebly and sporadically. These defensive symptoms had then lost their strength. The analysis came into still deeper waters and the main defences then took more formidable shapes.

What was revealed by a sedulous scrutiny of the context in which the jealous moods arose was a constant relation between them and a specific unconscious phantasy-situation which took shape in her life in ever-varying forms. The jealous moods constituted in fact a condensed and rationalized projection of this unconscious situation; while the flirtations and acts of infidelity represented a rationalized fulfilment of it. Thus in a sense it was correct that the jealousy was a projection of the patient's own infidelity; and yet not correct, since what was projected was actually something deeper, of which the infidelity itself was only one mode of expression. This unconscious situation, which I will call the ' dominant phantasy ', consisted of an impulse or an act on the patient's part of seizing and obtaining from some other person something she greatly desired, thus robbing and despoiling him or her. In her phantasy such an act or impulse presupposed a ' triangular situation '; if not necessarily in the sense that two other *persons* besides herself were required to fulfil its terms, at least two *objects* were essential in it. (Both objects might be persons or one might not be.) One of these two objects was the object of her desire which she would take possession of for her gratification; the other object, no less essential—indeed, an essential part of the first—was the person from whom the desired object was to be taken, the person who suffered the robbery and spoliation. A fulfilment of this unconscious phantasy could certainly be said to be the ruling passion

of her life; in the analysis it seemed for a time that she reacted to her environment only in so far as it provided gratification or disappointment of this 'dominant phantasy-situation.'

As far as I am able I will give typical forms and ways in which the phantasy expressed itself at the time of the analysis; naturally it had been active all her life. Thus: consciously she desired to win the love of her husband, children and all around her; their 'love', however, it appeared, was but a word; what it signified to her was their complete devotion and surrender to her. Her pleasure in gaining it would mean total loss to them of all right and possibility of pleasure for themselves; if they loved her they would surrender that for *her* pleasure. She would have obtained the desired object ('love') from them and they would be despoiled and destitute. I quote this to shew the abstract forms in which the phantasy consciously expressed itself; another of these, though less ego-syntonic, was in her snobbery. She consciously longed to enter higher social circles and obtain favours from more important people; this was to ensue by virtue of her husband's wealth and ability and her power to charm important men, though the actual favours she won would be those previously enjoyed by the women in the ranks above her. So she would possess the men and by their means rob the women. Next: during the analysis phantasies of my husband's death were rather frequent and thought out in detail. (It was while one of these was elaborating, on the basis of a real incident which came to her knowledge, that her jealous suspicions arose of letters being written to me by her husband.) Here again she wished to rob me of my husband; I should be a widow, but she would possess her husband. The *death* of another had a cardinal significance to her as leading to some advantage or benefit to herself. In her flirtations the situation became more concrete still: the men were all married or engaged; she was thus robbing their women of them or of the pleasures they gave her. Men, and these men in particular, to her unconscious were not full objects, real persons; they were the means and instruments (her agents) of obtaining the two gratifications: of sensual pleasure and of robbing their owners of them. Moreover, in many details of her relations with the men she often robbed them also of something, if not by taking away, then by refusing to give. Here the men (not women) were the rightful owners of something she took away; they were then the injured object and the pleasure-object was whatever she took from them.

In the detailed analysis of these sexual situations it became clear

how consistent and unremitting was this condition that all pleasures for her must be acquired and enjoyed *at some other person's expense*. This was shown in concrete ways enough in social relations and in character-traits. For instance, as long as money was freely available it gave her no pleasure to spend it on herself, but when financial stringency set in she could not resist buying expensive clothes for the first time in her life ; for it then meant some deprivation to her husband and children. She loved to bargain and often cheated ; another's loss was gain to her. She hated work and at school as a child had learnt nothing ; but she could learn and could work, on the condition that the gain accrued to herself alone, while others must be engaged in the undertaking at some cost to themselves. In social matters she disliked being a guest and avoided it ; she entertained willingly only her social or other inferiors, because then she was shewing them what she had got which they lacked. What she enjoyed was to have a person of importance entirely to herself, with the rest of the dramatis personæ excluded. The desire for a *preferential position* over some other person was a keynote in her psychology. Envy of me, made endurable by an attitude of contempt, was her prevailing mood in the transference. It is unfortunate that I cannot give a fuller outline of her character, or detailed analytic material which would support these interpretations of unconscious motive ; I can merely state that specific instances were manifold [3] and, as soon as the initial defences had been to a certain extent lifted, were unequivocal in their significance.

One piece of material, however, I can give here, which at bottom contains the gist of all the rest ; it is her masturbation-phantasy. She had never experienced orgasm in any way, but had been used since puberty to induce sexual excitation with local sensations by means of the following phantasy. *A young girl is in a doctor's consulting-room, being undressed and then examined by him ; there is another woman in the background.* The patient's feeling was one of intense horror, indignation and outrage, accompanied by strong masochistic and sexual excitation. Leaving on one side the exhibitionistic and scoptophilic elements of this conscious phantasy, into which I do not propose to enter now, the situation described will be seen to conform

[3] When I read some remarks upon this case before the British Psycho-Analytical Society, April, 1932, I quoted in full some illustrative material shewing the immediate connection between the ' dominant phantasy ' and the jealous moods.

precisely, though with some of its features in a reversed form, to the ' unconscious dominant phantasy ' I have outlined above. The girl who is being humiliated by the doctor, with another woman gloating in the background, represented the patient herself absorbing the attention and interest of the man and, by the revelation of her irresistible charms, enslaving him, thus robbing the other woman of him, outraging and despoiling her. Once or twice a dream consisted of this masturbation-phantasy *tout simple*, but in this primary form, the masochistic reversals of rôle between girl and woman being shed off in the dream. The doctor's sadistic stripping of the girl was a reversal of him as her agent robbing the woman to give all to the girl ; it also represented her capture of him by revealing her charms, but with him playing the responsible part. Needless to say, this highly condensed phantasy combined countless formulas, of which I can here indicate only one or two of the most important. Suffice it to say that the main outline of the conscious phantasy represented the ' dominant ' unconscious phantasy, but in a form in which the girl was heavily compensated against guilt or responsibility.

The explanation of my patient's jealous moods lay in their constant relation to the emergence, either in the transference or in daily life, of this dominant unconscious situation. When the intensity of the unconscious phantasy was heightened above a certain level, when the phantasy had been or was about to be actually realized—especially if in some *bodily* way, relating to sexuality, illness, death, etc.—then anxiety would develop to an extent which could only be relieved by projection of the impulses on to others and by a masochistic turning of the sadistic and predatory drive against herself. So in the jealous moods she declared that her husband and his other women were ' *robbing her of everything*, taunting, tantalizing, outraging her, stripping her of his love, of her own self-respect and self-confidence, casting her off, a victim, utterly helpless and destitute '. But this was precisely what in countless ways, as in her flirtations, she was unconsciously endeavouring to do to all around her.

The deepest unconscious significance, dating from earliest infantile experiences and developmental stages, both of the ' dominant ' unconscious phantasy and of the conscious masturbation-phantasy, may readily be surmised, even without the abundant evidence of the actual analytic material. The men (or the doctor) were childhood-substitutes for her father : the ' woman in the background ', or the women to be robbed and despoiled, were mother-figures constant throughout her

life. In the earliest (breast) identification with the mother lay the narcissistic character of the phantasy ; while the object-relation in it was exclusively to the mother. But the mother was, as one might say, a double object in herself, consisting of two parts : namely, herself and her possessions ; the father (or his penis, the agent) was one of her possessions, of which she was to be robbed. The mother's possessions consisted ultimately of her breasts, milk and her body-contents : fæces, children and the father's penis ; of all these she was to be despoiled.

The origin of the phantasy in the oral-erotic and oral-sadistic phase of development is not to be doubted, although I cannot here quote material in support of this statement. My description will have shown more clearly its derivation also from the next-succeeding sadistic phase [4] of attack on the mother's body-contents. As I have endeavoured to indicate, simple genital Œdipus desire and jealousy played little part in it, despite what one might call the attempt to rationalize the unconscious phantasy by ' genitalizing ' it into infidelity and jealousy situations. Men were not really persons and full objects to the patient's unconscious ; a man was either a penis or was the owner of a penis. Women were also part-objects, i.e. apprehended as divisible into part-objects. Doubtless a measure of true genitalization had been achieved and this was also represented. But what I wish to comment on is that ' triangular ' situations, which might be supposed to express the height of object-love may yet be rooted in narcissism ; jealousy and infidelity may have their foundation in the pregenital levels of oral-erotic and oral-sadistic impulse.[5] In persons whose psychical composition includes either jealousy or infidelity as a major pattern, my conclusion is that the ' loss of love ' or the ' search for love ' in question refers ultimately to something deeper than a genital relation to the desired parent. The quality of the attachments in such people, moreover, is often that to a part-object, thus facilitating the change of

[4] Cf. Melanie Klein, ' Early Stages of the Œdipus Conflict,' this JOURNAL, 1928, Vol. IX, p. 167.

[5] It strikes me as probable that the earliest affective triangular situation of all may be the child's relation to the mother's *two* breasts. There is certainly evidence of a later order in phantasies of dividing or sharing the two breasts (e.g. in men, the boy and the father each taking one), which makes it plausible that the earliest ambivalence may find its first positive and negative attachments to each of the two breasts singly, usually, of course, with constant changes.

real objects and explaining the relative indifference shewn to their objective personality. The ' search ' or the ' loss ' in such cases can be traced back to *oral envy*, and to the deprivation of the breast or father's penis (as an oral object)—the objects with which the parents in coitus are at that level felt to be gratifying each other. I would mention here the very prevalent confusion between the *words* ' envy ' and ' jealousy '.[6] which finds a quite precise derivation in this oral primal scene experience in which the two feelings would be indistinguishable. This and only this experience furnishes a rational basis for the acute and desperate sense of lack and loss, of dire need, of emptiness and desolation felt by the jealous one of a triangle and reversed by the unfaithful. The oral basis of jealous impulses may explain the greater incidence of jealousy in women, whose psychosexual development is more closely linked with the oral libido-organization than that of men.

There is no necessity for me to enter here into the operation of the masochistic and persecutory mechanism of projection as a method of defence. But my description of the unconscious forces at work in the patient's whole psychical situation has done no justice to the part played by anxiety and the action of the early super-ego in the formation of such a dominant phantasy situation as that described. Such oral-erotic and oral-sadistic impulses governing the whole psychic life are in no sense primary or ' purely pleasurable '. Doubtless one main motive of this key-phantasy was that of revenge upon the mother for all the deprivation her possession of desired pleasures, from the breast onwards, had inflicted on the child. But this is the common lot, and the patient's mother was particularly loving and generous, if not entirely wise. There can be no doubt that in this woman a high degree of constitutional oral libido had given rise to very intense early sadistic reactions, thus burdening the immature ego with a highly sadistic super-ego, and resulting in a conviction that such sadistic attacks on the mother had been carried out, and so causing severe anxiety. This state of things is a familiar one to us. What is unusual in the case is the way in which—or the degree to which—the ego then turned things to its own advantage, and out of a phantasy-situation of wishes and fears created a phantasy-situation of reassurance and defence, thus

[6] Significantly enough, the ' confusion ' leads always in one direction : the word jealousy is used where envy would be appropriate, which supports my view that jealousy serves as a more ego-syntonic substitute for envy.

concentrating and stabilizing it. This was done with the help of reality. The wish (the oral craving and the revengeful impulse) was to attack and despoil the mother, and seize and absorb all her possessions, rendering her destitute, with a corresponding fear of suffering the same fate. Then circumstances in the patient's childhood, together with early experiences of a traumatic nature, actually in certain ways realized the wish. The mother did suffer disastrous losses, which did in some ways benefit the patient ; moreover, without bringing upon her the retribution threatened by the super-ego. Thus the unconscious phantasy-situation became established and fixed, not only and not mainly as a gratification of erotic and sadistic libido, but as a condition of safety for the ego in reality as well ; so it became 'dominant'. Her never-ceasing efforts to obtain pleasures by despoiling and depriving another were efforts to repeat and re-instate the safe conditions of childhood in which a robbed and injured mother was always present and was always kind. So that over and above the gratification of revengeful and sadistic motives in it, the presence and participation of a despoiled rightful owner, who nevertheless endured his loss, became a *sine quâ non* for the ego's security in any gain of pleasure.[7] Her life was spent in testing and trying her position, her safety ; the jealous scenes and the flirtations were also tests and trials. I do not mean to say that the choice of this special defensive system was solely due to the real experiences of childhood. It was predominantly in phantasy that the mother was an enemy to her ; and we know that—whether in reality or still more in phantasy—to keep an enemy near at hand but disarmed and destitute is an approved method of safeguarding oneself against him. But I conclude that the high degree of concentration of all psychic trends into this one unconscious pattern, and its compulsive quality, were due to its having throughout childhood been tested and proved—up to a point—as a safe mode of outcome of the conflict. Yet only *up to a point.* It was safe for the patient to enjoy preferential positions, to possess more than her mother or mother-substitutes, to cheat harmlessly, to climb socially, as long as no specific *sexual* features entered into the situation and no crudely aggressive act on her part betrayed the unconscious impulses behind. But when, either in childhood or later, or during the analysis, circumstances occurred which led (or would lead) to too close a realization of the sexual (bodily) aspects of the unconscious

[7] Cf. The 'condition of love', described by Freud, of an 'injured third party' (*geschädigter Dritte*).

phantasy or to too direct disclosures of her own aggressive impulses in this respect, then the dominant phantasy failed her *as a defence.* Then other, more pathological but more effective, defences had to be called up. In childhood the security derived from the injuries to the mother had been disturbed by a sexual experience with a brother, which had resulted in serious obsessional symptoms. During the first years of married life, in spite of its sanction for sexual relations and childbearing, homosexual tendencies had arisen as an attempted solution of the anxiety-conflict. In the course of the analysis (which she had undertaken for the avowed purpose of ' getting the orgasm '), masochistic and persecutory jealousy appeared whenever any approach was made to obtaining what the orgasm stood for, what her childish masturbation had meant to her: getting milk, breast, penis and children out of her mother. The approach to success had to be thus violently counteracted; the super-ego's denunciations thus vehemently denied. ' They ', the others, the parents (and her super-ego), were guilty of rifling and ravaging, wasting and despoiling her; not she them.

In view of my contention here that jealousy may be used as a means of defence against unconscious conflicts and may in itself be a symptom of unconscious accusations from the super-ego, one must consider further whether this special motivation in jealousy has any general validity, even in reference to jealous feelings of a ' normal ' kind. Without going into the delicate, and probably disputed, question of what constitutes normal jealousy, there are certain general features on which all agree. Both Freud and Jones have commented on the ' narcissistic wound ' and feelings of self-criticism experienced, even in normal jealousy. On my shewing, this wound must be explained as the condemnation by the super-ego and the expiation by the ego for unconscious predatory and aggressive impulses in the subject himself. So one must surmise that some of the bitterness of every jealousy, whether founded or unfounded on fact, comes from the jealous person's unconscious apprehending the partner's infidelity to be a retribution on him for his own aggressions perpetrated in his earliest phantasies. The basis for normality in jealous feeling seems to depend on whether the subject's own anxieties about unconscious impulses to rob and despoil parental figures of each other's love-objects and possessions are great enough to need the reassurance and absolution of passively suffering an attack of the kind ' in reality ' himself.

This point of view naturally suggests the possibility that such

women as my patient may actually unconsciously instigate their husbands to acts of infidelity, or at any rate be affected in their choice of object by such a tendency. All analysts no doubt know of men and women actually creating such situations themselves, proposing to the partner to take up another sexual relation, thus forming a triangular situation and giving themselves occasion for jealousy.

A psycho-analytic study of jealousy would be hardly conceivable without a reference to Othello. No detailed discussion of the play is needed: the unconscious motivation of jealousy that analysis reveals stands in the forefront of Shakespeare's plot, though he straightway so cleverly discounts and glosses over it that we forget it forthwith. The first act of the play seems irrelevant to the subsequent story, yet it is vital in the depths. It shews us Desdemona's old father, his grief and fury caused by Othello's abduction of his daughter, his bitter reproaches and accusations, his threats and prophecies of disaster. Othello had won his loved object by seizure from her owner—the father. But more than this: to my mind the main expression of Othello's all-important psychic guilt, without which his jealous mania would have been impossible, has been placed by Shakespeare where none can overlook it and yet again where none of us need see it for what it is—it is his blackness! 'It is the cause, *it is the cause, my soul*'—the old tradition has it that with these words the actor spoke to his own image in a mirror, which he contrasts in the next breath with Desdemona's 'whiter skin'. Does not Othello's blackness, also seemingly irrelevant, sum up in one symbol the whole story of his guilt, doubt, anxiety and his mode of defence against them? Iago the envious is but his alter ego. He cannot endure the evil in himself. He must make Desdemona black instead.

INTROJECTION AND PROJECTION IN THE MECHANISM OF DEPRESSION

BY

J. HÁRNIK

BERLIN

According to Freud and Abraham, it is characteristic of the process preceding a depression that the ego takes back into its possession an object which for certain reasons had become valueless and had to be discarded. The mechanism of introjection, which we think of as a kind of incorporation, is here used in order to enable the object to be re-established in the ego. As regards the process of devaluation, Abraham shewed further that the object, after being in phantasy transformed into a corpse, i.e. killed, is identified with fæces. Thus the necrophagy underlying incorporation is based upon the identity of corpse and excrement in the unconscious. Hence it followed almost as a matter of course that the transformation into a fæces-corpse, which corresponds to the killing of the object, must have been modelled on the physiological act of defæcation and was to be interpreted as an anal expulsion of the devalued object.[1]

As a result of my own investigations, I believe the following slight but important correction of this interpretation to be necessary. It seems to me that in depression-formation the expulsion of the object prior to introjection regularly occurs *orally*, and that in this process reflex vomiting (in a certain sense a pathological occurrence) serves as the physical prototype. Postponing a theoretical discussion of this assumption for the moment, I will try to illustrate it by a clinical example.

The case in question, which I will describe as far as is necessary, is not one of melancholia in the psychiatric sense, but rather of a very bad attack of so-called neurotic depression. Nevertheless, on the basis of the above view, I have already been able to make some observa-

---

[1] In consequence of this discovery Abraham was able to put to the test and largely to extend the theory of the stages of pregenital development (particularly the anal-sadistic stage), about which research will still have much to say. He further came to hold that anal expulsion was so closely related to paranoic projection that, in order to explain persecution, the notion of ' anal introjection ' needed to be introduced. On this point some observations will be offered here.

ions in cases of real depression which lead me to believe that the existence of the same mechanism will find confirmation in them. Moreover, whilst the psycho-analytic distinction between psychotic and neurotic melancholia is a problem not yet fully solved by our metapsychological or economic description, yet it seems probable that we shall more and more have to draw upon the lighter, less complicated, clearer forms of illness precisely in order to understand the still obscure differences and nuances in the genesis of psychotic disturbance.

In the course of an analysis, the subject of which was a good-looking young married woman, I was able to observe the attack mentioned above, from its onset to its very gradual disappearance. The latter, I think, I can accredit in the main to the resolving process of the analysis. A few details will make the extent of the depression clear. The patient herself found it subjectively so unbearable that she continually declared (with a pointed insinuation against the analysis) that she had never before experienced anything like it. And one could perhaps say that, from a retrospective biographical point of view, she appeared for the most part hypomanic in character ; which is only an apparent contradiction. In any case, it is easy to prove that the ever-recurring suicidal impulses had well-marked antecedents in her childhood. Once, during the period of the analysis, she actually allowed herself to be struck and thrown down by a motor car. Although this was entirely unwilled, the unconscious intention was clear ; but fortunately she was only slightly injured. She repeated here, although not literally, an incident of her pre-school period. She grew up in a garrison town in the provinces, her father being an officer of high rank. One day she was allowed to watch a parade of the garrison in which her father appeared on horseback. Hardly had the child caught sight of him, when she broke away from the servant's hand and rushed towards him with such impetuousness that she was nearly caught under the horse's hoofs. That a real urge towards self-injury must have been present in this behaviour appears from the fact that at the same age (about five) she set about something else which can only be interpreted as a child's way of attempting suicide. In the fine garden of her home there was one of the customary fountains. One of her older sisters and our patient had the idea of lying on the ground underneath the water in order to practise ' seeing stars ' with their eyes open (the well-known phenomenon which usually occurs upon stimulation of the closed eyes). Our young heroine, however, was so much in earnest about the notion that she simply would not come out of the water until her sister, who

had long since climbed out, became frightened and called the gardener. The latter then managed to bring the self-willed young personage back to the daylight. The circumstance that here, in distinction to many adult suicides, the thought of the next world (going to heaven) is specially emphasized does not negate the wish for death. And it was this desire that returned in the above-mentioned period of depression many years later, in so powerful a form that while bathing and swimming she was forced to protect herself by phobic inhibitions. For this reason I believe that this period of her childhood must have been passed under the sign of the ' primal depression ', if it is permissible to use Abraham's apt expression in a somewhat generalized sense.

Before I go into the details of the cause of this primal depression, let me make clear the reality-situation which led to the formation of the depression during the analysis. The patient learned that her husband had deceived her with another woman, and although she had not before set any great value on his physical faithfulness and, true to her tendency towards over-compensation, had even encouraged him to occasional polygamous behaviour, she now reacted with extreme jealousy. She allowed a deep estrangement to develop between them, with a growing tendency to break away from him completely. The depression appeared as a sign of her inability for the time being to solve the problem. It was true that her husband had previously given her occasion for disappointment, in more ways than one, but all this could only become manifest after the devaluation of the love-object in the unconscious had already proceeded very far. We need not stop to consider all the motives at work, which were nothing out of the ordinary. What has been said suffices to raise the question how far she had had any similar experience in her relations with her father at the particular period of her childhood mentioned. There were no births in her family at this critical period. Strikingly numerous memories, however, for the most part painful, centre round a summer spent at the seaside when the patient was about four years old. Difficulties in eating seem to have been the order of the day, and correction and punishment by the father occurred far oftener than had before been usual. Then, out of a confusion of minor events, one quite peculiar occurrence stood out ; she was found one day with her bed full of the blood-red remnants of a bilberry preserve which she had vomited. Whereupon her mother had exclaimed : ' I thought she had been murdered ! '

At this point I may describe the way in which the comprehension

of this early experience helped me to understand the criss-cross pattern of psychic connections between the present conflict and the childhood trauma. At the time when her dejection was first beginning, she often brought the charge against me (who felt very innocent in the matter) that I also desired her death. She really meant her mother (in the transference) ; she herself later on interpreted the horrified cry of her mother as such a wish. One now had, or at least one might believe one had, a clear picture of the case. The analysis must have touched upon the primary sources of the Œdipus complex : the reproach against the mother could be interpreted as a projection of her own death-wish (which later became but too frequently conscious) ; while her troubled relations with her father (repeated in her marriage, as we have seen) would arise from disappointment because he only did those mysterious, terrifying sexual things with her mother. And the patient was always ready, particularly in the latter part of the analysis (we shall later understand why), to set the witnessing of the primal scene in this period. In any case she certainly soon became convinced that she knew about her mother's bleeding from the genitals even at that early date. It is thus clear that the ' bloody ' vomit (interpreted as blood, whatever may have been its cause) acquired for her the meaning of ' bleeding like her mother ' and came to express the identification with her.

Our satisfaction with this straightforward picture is not, however, long-lived, even though in order to simplify matters I leave out all those complicating factors through which, as we know, analyses that are patiently persevered in may often become very unclear. It so happened in fact that protracted further work upon the infantile problems which had been brought to light led to an unexpected supplement to the memories of that summer holiday. The patient suddenly *knew* that she had then, small as she was, thrown a sand-spade with full force in her father's face and hurt him with it. He had evidently in some way made her angry ; more important, however, is the fact that she must already have been in a state of great irritation with him. We note here first of all the confirmation of our familiar experience that no one tries to kill himself who has not previously wished to kill some other, deeply loved person. We have thus found the motive of ' bleeding ' in two guises, the passive-oral and the active-sadistic ; and in double form, too, the suicidal reaction in the following phase of depression, the active-oral (water) and passive-masochistic (horse). We need not consider the sexual-symbolic wish-

fulfiment arising out of the Œdipus complex (although the latter was by no means weak in this subject). We find in fact, when we learn the cause of the little girl's bad behaviour, that we have moved on to the ground of the pre-Œdipal (more correctly: pregenital) conflicts, characterised by the extremely ambivalent nature of their impelling forces.

Everything started from the fact that during that summer she had had to learn to forgo the presence of a nurse to whom she was extraordinarily attached. The woman had been discharged about this time, or probably shortly before, for reasons unknown. The child had never been able to forget their leave-taking and the experience of suddenly finding herself deprived of that familiar figure. The fixation on this servant appears in a very special light when we consider that it was through her that the child had experienced the primal scene. This had occurred at a much earlier date—she was perhaps two years old at the time. Intercourse between the father and the nurse in the form of *fellatio* was the content of the scene. The circumstances under which this discovery—the fruit of prolonged analytical endeavours—was made, the hallucinatory vividness with which the memory-image arose in the patient's mind, were proof for the analyst of the correctness of his find. The patient herself felt finally not the slightest doubt as to the reality of this recollection.

Thus we can now approach the period of conflict with a better understanding. The interpretation of the vomiting as a sign of a strongly oral disposition—the many other manifestations of which cannot here be discussed—has received powerful added support, of a kind which is based upon an actual experience and independent of constitutional factors. Less easy to understand is the general attitude of the little girl. The wish that she should now be loved by the father in the place of the departed nurse is clearly recognizable, and gives the general Œdipus attitude which we have been supposing present a definite (more or less doubled) content. It is no contradiction of this that the child sought gratification from the father in a particular way, through provoking punishment, in other words, in a masochistic fashion. The explanation may on the one hand be that the libido had meanwhile developed to a higher (yet still pregenital) level, or, on the other hand, that we have here a step in the movement towards the Œdipus complex (the mother's bleeding). In spite of the foregoing counter-tendencies, however, the impression given was that her attitude to her father was marked by great proneness to sudden

extraordinary rages, and perhaps even by general hostility; the nurse's discharge must have been the most important motive for this attitude. Thus the mourning for this lost love-object—probably in conjunction with the unattainability of her Œdipus wishes—was able to prevent her from turning her love towards her father, and even earlier had caused her to enter upon this phase with an excessively unbalanced ambivalence. Thus we are made aware of two things: first, the peculiar part which bisexuality—or, more exactly, the complete Œdipus complex—no doubt always plays in the anterior history of a phase of depression; and secondly, the way in which this analysis of an infantile depression-formation again verifies the well-known thesis that a deep-reaching, probably primary ambivalence—one that makes possible the complete inversion of love into hate—is a necessary condition of the process of devaluation of the sexual object. We have already briefly referred to the devaluation of the object in the present conflict, in describing the relations of our patient to her husband. In order to elucidate the fashion in which she most probably carried out a similar process with her father, I may mention that one of her most unpleasant childhood memories was that of having seen him, usually so powerful and impressive, dead-drunk and in a disgraceful state. Among the factors determining the dangerous game in the fountain, it is possible that the association of ideas 'drunk-drowned'[2] played some part (as in so many other cases). Here an approach to a 'melancholic' identification—at any rate the introjection of the disappointing father—becomes apparent. Let me therefore just indicate that, starting from this point, a far-reaching general identification with the father took place and became fully established; in fact this identification proved to be the libidinal trend by which the subject was chiefly enabled to bring her Œdipus complex to a nearly normal issue.

This single case cannot of course provide a direct proof of the correctness of the assertion made at the beginning of this paper, viz. that the expulsion of the devalued object from the ego is a psychic mechanism modelled on the physical prototype of vomiting. But we are greatly confirmed in our view when we find that, since that incident in her childhood, the woman in question has never once vomited again. She contrived, or, more accurately, she was constitutionally impelled, to keep such mechanisms for the intrapsychic adjustment of certain

[2] [In German: '*Betrunken-Ertrunken.*']

object-relationships.[3] An attitude such as I have postulated in the above psychic operation seems to find expression in certain of our colloquialisms, as for example, when we say of someone, ' He makes me sick ', or ' He gives me a pain in the stomach '.[4] When the expulsion of the object actually occurs, this is in fact very much as if, in a psychological sense, the subject felt constrained to be sick over the person ' closest to him '.[5] This happens, according to my observation, in more or less violent scenes of ' having the thing out ' with the object, during which reproaches are heaped upon him, threats poured over him. Strangely enough, it is just after such an outburst, which according to common expectation should bring relief, that the depression (i.e. the sign that a swift re-introjection has taken place) usually sets in. I will indeed gladly admit that it was this observation which led me to put to myself the problem how such a sequence of events was to be fitted into the accepted scheme of causal relationships of the oral-cannibalistic mechanisms. And we may recall here that all the weight of the grave illnesses which arise in this way demands the metapsychological explanation that the whole, or a large part, of the sexual activity of an individual may find its way into these illnesses.

Finally a few words about the relationship of these mechanisms to the neighbouring region of paranoic projection. Following in principle Abraham's train of thought, I thus thought it legitimate to suppose that the process of paranoic projection should be regarded as in every way equivalent to the (oral) expulsion of the object as described above (i.e. killing by turning into fæces-corpse). It was therefore a great satisfaction to me to discover that I. Hendrick in New York would seem to take a similar view, as a result of his work on a case of (paranoid ?) schizophrenia, in which in childhood vomiting had also played a large part.[6] He evidently wishes to appropriate the term ' ejection '

---

[3] Possibly this conception can throw some light on the hypomanic character-constellation which partly dominated her.

[4] [In German : *' Er wäre " ein Brechmittel ",' ' er läge einem schwer im Magen '.*]

[5] [In German : *' Den, der ihm nahesteht '*, close relative.]

[6] ' Ego Defence and the Mechanism of Oral Ejection in Schizophrenia,' this JOURNAL, Vol. XII, 1931.

According to a report in the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Sheehan-Dare of London uses, in a very matter of course way, the notion of an oral expulsion of the love-object, alternating with incorporation, to explain the determining factors of stammering. I should be very curious

for the mechanism in question, and I should feel disposed to follow him in this proposal. The term would then embrace all cases of pathological projection (on an oral basis) and would leave the use of the general term ' projection ' fully open for the present for the purposes of varying interpretations. For the remainder, I have already tried, in my discussions with Dr. Mack-Brunswick, to indicate the possibility of an interpretation such as I have suggested above, and I should like to point out again what a host of interesting problems await solution everywhere in this field. There are, for example, all the questions concerning the different attitudes towards the projected object in melancholia and paranoia (using these terms schematically). These attitudes are undoubtedly opposite in kind. The difference between them seems to amount to this : in paranoia the object, now become hateful, is as it were left outside. But what happens after that ? When we are so far, what psychic processes lead on to the key feature of persecutory paranoia—the feeling of being followed ? What is the course of these changes in the object-cathexis, of which the final outcome led Abraham to the provisional hypothesis of an *anal introjection?*

It has at any rate proved worth while to examine critically those anal-erotic derivatives to which Abraham ascribed a causal influence in the genesis of manic-depressive states.

---

to see her grounds for this. It seems to me, however, that as far as this disturbance is concerned her clinical note ' emphasizing the necessity for a more accurate classification of stammering in relation to the psychoneuroses ' is not less important. (Cf. here Fenichel's suggestion of setting up a special group of ' pregenital conversion-neuroses '. ' Über respiratorische Introjektion ', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XVII, 1931, p. 252.)

SOME PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION IN WOMEN[1]

BY

MARJORIE BRIERLEY

LONDON

The opinion is now widely held among analysts that it is difficult for women to achieve a successful integration of their psychic forces on account of certain special inter-related features in their libido and ego development. In relation to libido development it is said that a woman has a double task to perform in order to attain full femininity. She has not only to change the method and aim of gratification, to make the switch-over from clitoral to vaginal primacy : she has further to exchange her original love object, the mother, for an object belonging to the opposite sex, the father (3, 4, 7, 11, 12). At once we come up against the fact that even such matters of common knowledge as these must be accepted only with reservation. As Douglas Bryan has pointed out (2), the transference from clitoris to vagina is by no means absolute. There are many women in whom clitoral stimulation is a necessary precondition to vaginal orgasm. If then we find a considerable range of clitoral activity compatible with, or even necessary to, vaginal normality, perhaps we should do better to speak of normality as dependent upon a particular kind of co-ordination between the two functions rather than on a supplanting of one by the other. The time at which the vagina becomes cathected is a moot point. It used to be taken for granted that this occurred only after puberty (Ferenczi described the important part played by menstruation in preparing the organ for its adult functions (5)), but several observers, including Melanie Klein and Josine Müller, now maintain that vaginal activity begins much earlier. Josine Müller's posthumous paper (24) conveys the impression that infantile vaginal cathexis (Œdipus phase cathexis), followed by latency repression, is the rule rather than the exception. Alteration of aim and method of gratification are in any case not confined to women if partial impulses are taken into consideration. From the point of view of oral erotism the path of feminine development would seem to be more direct than the male since the penis-vagina situation is a straightforward repetition of the original nipple mouth relation. Moreover, the alteration of the sex of the object ascribed to the woman is an alteration only from the later point of

[1] Paper read before the British Psycho-Analytical Society, 3 February 1932.

view of full person object-choice, there is no alteration of the early organ-object beyond direct displacement. Difficulties in genital function can often be traced to sadism associated with this enduring unchanged object. A vagina which has acquired too strong cannibalistic tendencies will be afraid to suck for fear of biting (19, 28).

Much controversy formerly centred round the question of the primary and the regressive valuation of the phallic phase, with its associated castration complex. Thus Freud stated the view that the lack of the penis turns the little girl towards her father in the hope of securing a child to make up for the missing organ. He writes (11): 'Whereas in boys the Œdipus complex succumbs to the castration complex, in girls it is made possible and led up to by the castration complex'. Karin Horney first elaborated the complementary view (complementary I believe rather than contradictory) that the castration complex with its penis envy as clinically observed is invariably a product of regresson following frustration by the father, a flight from femininity (17, 18). According to Helene Deutsch such regression is not only a result of disappointment and a protection against guilt, but is also a means of ego-defence against id-masochism (5). Ernest Jones (19) has described the economic advantages of such a father-identification outcome of the Œdipus situation, and has gone so far as to conclude that the so-called phallic phase is simply a period of such identification. At the present moment, however, the importance of the phallic phase as such seems to have yielded place to rather more general problems of the time and manner in which the Œdipus situation comes into being, the relation between positive and negative Œdipus phases and the phenomena of their resolution, or non-resolution. The case for universal early incidence of the Œdipus conflict and its importance in pregenital development rests in the main on the observations of Melanie Klein (20, 21), and other child-analysts using play-technique and on corroborative evidence from adult analyses. On this view the little girl's first impetus towards the father is supplied by the earliest maternal frustration: the loss of the nipple drives her to the search for the penis. A phase regularly occurs in which this penis is imagined to be part of the much desired contents of the mother's body, and the sadistic impulses connected with these fantasies give rise to what in Klein's opinion is the true major feminine anxiety (22), comparable to the male castration fear, namely, fear of internal bodily injuries. On this view the genital Œdipus conflict has the character of a revised or final draft of a play which is enacted in all the pregenital

phases in the appropriate idiom, but in which the plot throughout remains the same. In the transition from archaic to genital levels it is possible to distinguish two lines or directions of displacement of cathexis, namely, a nipple-penis-fæces-child line and a mouth-anus-vagina line. The relation of the earliest organ cathexes to the earliest person cathexes seems still rather obscure.

Freud in his last paper in this JOURNAL (12), describes things from a different standpoint. On the evidence of adult analyses, analyses mainly he says of women with strong father fixations, he concludes that there is a long period, prior to the establishment of the positive Œdipus attitude, a period which he prefers to call pre-œdipal. In this pre-œdipal phase the mother figures as the love object, though the relation to her is highly ambivalent in character. The hostility increases with each fresh experience of frustration at the mother's hands until the recognition of the absence of a penis (interpreted perhaps as punishment by the mother for masturbation) brings it to such a pitch that the mother is thrown over in favour of the father. Freud inclines to endorse de Groot's conclusion (15) that the positive Œdipus phase is regularly preceded by a negative one, and emphasizes the fact that the father and the husband so frequently take over the ambivalent relation properly belonging to the mother. He also comments on the alternation of active and passive attitudes throughout the pre-œdipal period, the active phases often seeming to be reactions to the passive in the sense of attempts at mastery. The main difference here then is the late appearance of the father as an object, and the relative weight ascribed to different types of frustration. For Freud it is still the phallic frustration which is really decisive for femininity and the core of complaint against the mother the fact of being born a girl rather than Œdipus rivalry. Strong father fixation implies strong mother fixation and the hostility to the mother is completed by Œdipus rivalry but not initiated by it. Three solutions of the phallic problem are possible: a general retreat from sexuality; retention of masculinity which may result in manifest homosexual object choice; or transference to the father ushering in positive Œdipus attitude and subsequent feminine development. The crucial decision is made at the close of the phallic stage. These views seem to contrast with those expressed in 'The Psycho-Genesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman' (9), but there is nowhere in the new paper any denial that Œdipus frustration may result in regression to homosexuality, only an insistence on the priority of the mother fixation over the father fixation.

The factors affecting the dissolution of the Œdipus complex remain to be considered. Freud himself (10, 11) holds that dissolution is rarely so complete as in the male and that persistent father-fixation is relatively common because the strong drive provided by castration anxiety in the male is lacking. The woman has not the same impetus to give up the father. Others have found satisfactory equivalents to the castration drive. Ernest Jones (19) maintains that castration, strictly defined, is only a partial threat. He says 'what boy and girl alike fear is the total extinction of the power to feel at all, aphanisis, which results from over-stimulation and frustration'. Deutsch (5) finds the main drive away from the father in the ego fear of feminine id-masochism, dread of the masochistic triad, castration-defloration-parturition. Müller-Braunschweig (25) concentrates on the fear of violation. Melanie Klein's fears of internal injury seem clinically to be bound up with fear of violation and of parturition. For this group the decision to be or not to be a woman is taken at this stage, at the close and not at the beginning of the genital Œdipus phase. As Ernest Jones says, either sex or incest must be renounced. 'The girl must choose, broadly speaking, between sacrificing her erotic attachment to the father and sacrificing her femininity. . . . Either the father or the vagina (including pregenital vaginas) must be renounced. In the first case feminine wishes are developed on the adult plane, i.e. diffuse erotic charm, positive vaginal attitude towards coitus, culminating in pregnancy and childbirth, and are transferred to more accessible objects. In the second case the bond with the father is retained but the object relationship in it is converted into identification, i.e. a penis complex is developed. In Jones' opinion the drive to complete identification which results in manifest homosexuality is really determined by an intensification of oral sadistic impulses so that, although the actual turning is taken at the end of the Œdipus phase, the issue is largely pre-determined.

Problems of ego-development in women have so far received much less attention. They have taken the form, very often, of suspiciously wide generalizations. One of the best supported of these is perhaps the ascription to women of character peculiarities derived from strong secondary narcissism. This increase of narcissism is ascribed to compensation for absence of the male organ, e.g. by Hárnik (16), but can also be regarded as a defence against masochism, e.g. by Deutsch (5), that is to say a genitalization of the body instead of the vagina (not only instead of the penis).

Freud (8) associates this increased narcissism with the narcissistic

type of object choice and the desire to be loved rather than to love which he thinks most normal in women. The significance of the functions of reproduction and the amount of libido they can absorb has been convincingly described by Deutsch (3, 4). Freud, however, does not take this possible drainage of libido into reproductive channels into account in his search for reasons for the relatively small contributions made by women to civilization. He accounts for this by the relative persistence of father-fixation which he also makes responsible for defective Super-ego development. He says (11), ' I cannot escape the notion (though I hesitate to give it expression) that for women the level of what is ethically normal is different from what it is in men. Their Super-ego is never so inexorable, or so impersonal, so independent of its emotional origins as we require it to be in men '. Sachs (30) notes that a certain type of women seem to have no Super-ego of their own, but to borrow their Super-egos from their lovers. Where however a true Super-ego is developed it is of a decidedly severe type. According to Sachs, the Œdipus situation dies out in an oral phase, and the development of a true Super-ego is dependent upon complete renunciation of all the infantile wishes relating to the father but particularly of the oral ones. He says of woman, ' She can only acquire a Super-ego by accepting deprivation as a life-long ideal '. Sylvia Payne (27) has given it as her opinion that the Super-ego in women is usually more prohibitive as compared with men, in whom it is more permissive. Both Freud and Sachs are thinking of what we are perhaps more accustomed now to consider as the final stages of Super-ego formation, the stage of Œdipus object introjection.

From time to time complaints have been made about sex-prejudice vitiating the results of observation. It does not seem that this could ever be a serious danger in a field open to both sexes. Any tendency to distortion would be easily corrected or cancelled out. One point has emerged, however, in connection with this question which has a bearing on the capacity for sublimation. It has been suggested (17, 18) that there is an unconscious correlate of penis envy in the female, namely, baby envy in the male, and that the superior fertility of men in the wider cultural field is really compensation for the incapacity to bear children. If this is so, it would seem that feminine drives are really more easy to sublimate than masculine. Müller (24) noticed that women with full vaginal capacity seemed to be more successful in their careers than genitally inhibited women. The influence of social conditions is hard to estimate if only for the reason pointed out

by Deutsch (5) that women would hardly put up with social restrictions if they did not find compensation in other ways. It seems to be true that men have, and for a long time past have had, far more channels open to them, even in the highest civilizations, for relatively direct expression of their *aggression*, and that this may have something to do with their relatively greater freedom from anxiety inhibitions, which are such a marked feature of feminine activities though by no means confined to them.

It seems that this whole field of feminine psychology abounds in problems which need a great deal more investigation and that here, as elsewhere, their solution must be dependent on clinical findings. Intermediate types ought to provide useful material here, since in them one might be able to watch the swing to and fro between hetero- and homo-sexual tendencies and the balance which is required for equilibrium to be maintained. It may therefore be worth while to consider briefly some of the conclusions suggested by the clinical observation of a small number of such half-way-house cases, although the sample is too restricted to warrant any but the most tentative generalizations.

Clinically these cases varied, but they were all anxiety types, and all in the course of analysis revealed ability to employ both conversion and paranoid mechanisms. Obsessional and cyclothymic features were present in some, but with few exceptions most of these complained of inhibitions and unhappiness rather than of positive symptom constructions. They were well-endowed, physically and mentally, many with strong cultural drives, but their lives were restricted in differing degrees by prohibitions which hemmed them in. Not one felt at home in life. Their manifest sexual behaviour fell roughly into two groups. One group were virgin and had aim-inhibited relations only, with occasional recrudescence of masturbation. Another group were married (some had children), but had remained almost consistently frigid. Most of these dated their troubles to marriage.

The virgin group exhibited a kind of dead-lock between masculine and feminine tendencies. On the surface there was usually a wistful appreciation of the desirability of marriage and childbearing together with the conviction that these were not for them. They were unattractive to men, incapable of falling in love or physically unfit for intercourse. These feelings were often accompanied by a very painful sense of inferiority to married or attractive women but also by a lively horror of homosexuality. The degree of restriction in their social relations varied, but it was always considerable, particularly in regard

to the opposite sex. These women had split their tender from their sensual feelings and conducted their lives with a view to keeping these sensual feelings suppressed. They had developed a technique of avoidance, not necessarily of all men, but of seemingly virile men, and of all situations which could conceivably lead to intimacy. They were continually occupied in warding off assault by sexual father substitutes. They had for the most part a clear conscious dread of violation. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it was exaggerated anxiety about violation which was responsible both for the persistence of the father-fixations and the flight from femininity. This is the type of case which very strongly supports the view that fear of violation is the partial fear which plays the same rôle in relation to the Œdipus complex in women as the castration fear in men. That is to say, that a certain optimum degree will ensure the giving up of the immediate infantile wishes in relation to the father, but without preventing normal hetero-sexual development later, but that excessive anxiety defeats its object and leads to fixation with regression and inhibition of femininity (cf. 23). Here, however, it is necessary to take into account another factor. It soon becomes apparent that the technique of avoidance has a second determinant, namely, the protection of the man and more particularly his sexual organ. All sorts of touch taboos are frequent. It may be very difficult to decide which is the more dreaded, the active or the passive assault, and hardly possible to describe one as secondary to the other. The impulse to assault links first with revenge ideas for betrayal by the father, especially clearly where this has been driven home by the birth of a younger child. It has also strong penis envy components, mixed with highly sadistic oral wishes. The Œdipus revenge coloration is even clearer in varieties of behaviour which stop short of avoidance, namely common types of social gaucherie, cutting, ignoring after encouraging, getting the snub in first, and so on. These women often get on fairly easily with less virile (supposedly impotent) types of men, and this seems to be due not merely to their being less dangerous to the patients but to the fact that they offer less temptation to their sadism. Œdipus revenge ideas presumably exist in all women, so that it seems possible that such revenge impulses normally reinforce violation anxiety and the two together produce a strong drive to detachment from the father, but that it is a drive which may very easily become too strong and bind instead of freeing.

Behind the more obvious Œdipus determinants of the violation and revenge ideas, a wealth of tangled phantasies came to light,

dominated by highly coloured versions of the primal scene, and leading back through all the pregenital phases apparently to the womb. Certain guiding threads could be distinguished, trains of masochistic and sadistic ideas relating to both parents. One set of masochistic thoughts expressed the fear that intercourse would prove a repetition of injury already experienced at the mother's hands. This injury had a vivid phallic version but equally definite anal, or rather fæcal, and nipple connotations. It went back to weaning. As castration, it was punishment for masturbation. Another set of masochistic ideas dealt more definitely with internal injuries of the Klein type, disembowelments and feminine impotence. It is these masochistic ideas which make a hetero-sexual position untenable. In these cases, however, homosexuality is not a way out because it is too sadistic. Interwoven with the masochistic fantasies are highly aggressive ones connecting with the primal scene father, the penis and the mother's body. Oscillations occur between the two attitudes, but safety seems to have been sought rather in relinquishing both and in regression to a narcissistic position in which the drama is played out with the patient in both rôles. Some of these self-sufficient fantasies are genital, fantasies of hermaphroditism and dreams of self-violation, but the greater part are anal and some are remembered from childhood and connect with real or play incidents. Babies and lovers are here made in the lavatory and appear in dreams with fæcal characters, e.g. an Indian husband. Conflict at this level is still very acute, and we are soon involved in what seems a more definitely archaic cycle of oral-anal fantasies. Genital ideas are not lacking, there are plenty of fantasies of oral intercourse and oral parturition, but the impression gains ground that in spite of evidence of regression we are here up against an original pregenital core which has a vital connection with the later genital failure and especially with the accentuation of aggression which bulks so largely in it. These fantasies centre round the introjected nipple-penis object; there is a sense of oscillation between external and internal dangers and a number of paired attitudes, that is to say, not merely ambivalence in the sense of love and hate, but in the sense of activity and passivity. The object itself is both good and bad. The good object must be preserved because it is essential to life and the danger here is of deprivation from outside. The bad object must be got rid of because it threatens from within. There was plenty of evidence that the goodness of the object was the goodness of the original feeding nipple and that the badness had been acquired by

projection of sadism roused by frustration. Cannibalism and necrophilic ideas were all marked. Not only the hate but the love attitude was suppressed because of its devouring quality. In short, there seemed to be here an accentuation of primary oral sadism. In these three cases this had led, not to homosexuality as in those described by Jones (19), but to flight from sexuality as a whole. We have also noted that the genital phantasies in these cases were influenced by highly sadistic primal scene notions. Are we to derive the sadism of this primal scene from the oral sadism, and if so, is there any explanation of the accentuation of this sadism other than congenital predisposition ? The facts in at least one case definitely suggest a traumatic origin, though they do not of course exclude pre-disposition. In this case weaning occurred very early on account of illness. This in itself must have been enough to produce a strong reaction, but in addition, the baby seems to have slept during this critical period in a cot in the parents' room. The conclusion which suggests itself, and which is borne out by the analytical material, is that the primal scene was experienced during the period of acute oral frustration, and it was this conjunction which proved too much and led to denial, first of the scene itself and later of both sexual rôles.

Both parental fixations were certainly strong in these cases, but the relation to the father seemed to date very far back, so that the recognition of the lack of a penis as such would only have given one more impetus towards him. It seemed as though castration and penis envy and the genital negative Œdipus had all been reinforced in the unsuccessful attempt to overcome the positive Œdipus attitude. I found no indisputable evidence of early vaginal activity. What there was was more readily understood in terms of oral and anal experience.

Some glimpses of the evolution of object choice emerged from the phantasies. In no case could I get behind the nipple-penis object. It was as if the penis had been equated with the nipple very early and its differentiating characters only recognised much later. The later phallic penis retained many of the original characters, notably, its dangerousness, and it looked as though the over-estimation of the penis which was the rule was partly a consequence of its high oral value. Parents as persons seem to take shape as hostile forces removing the nipple object, and then as alternative owners or sharers of it. During the period of oral frustration when the object was introjected and became dangerous, a split occurred in the larval parent ideas. The thwarting parent joined the dangerous object inside and help against

both was sought from outside, that is from a good parent outside (31, 32). The process seemed to be repeated at later stages giving rise to a kind of stratification of objects which seems to correspond with Edward Glover's grades of early Ego differentiation (13). What seemed to distinguish the series was the definite hostility of the first shadowy parent and the accentuation of the ambivalence in all phases, so that even the Œdipus parents were split, with very definite separation of the sexual bad from the asexual tender ones. At each stage the bad parent only seemed to be introjected, the good one remaining outside. Super-ego development in these women is defective then, but it is defective in a slightly different sense to that implied by Freud and Sachs. The introjection of the Œdipus love objects is impaired inasmuch as only their primal scene aspects are absorbed. The tender aspects remain with the real parents and their substitutes outside, and the ego is driven to them for protection against both Super-ego and Id drives. It does not seem true to say that these women have no super-ego of their own, but they do have a very cruel archaic one with very little love in it, and in consequence they are continually driven to borrow protection from outside against it. Hence perhaps their frequent undue dependence on parents and the fear of loss of love stressed by Freud. Such women can never get enough love to balance the threat of their self-hatred.

Ego-identifications with parents are often marked in these cases, especially identification with the father, since any approach to obvious femininity is so heavily banned. There is one striking feature about these identifications and that is that they are all maimed. The Ego is always a castrated father or a barren shattered mother, and its conduct of life is correspondingly crippled. This situation has very definite economic advantages because it does permit considerable gratification of id and Super-ego sadism, although entirely at the expense of the ego. This seems to be a reason why the condition is sometimes so obstinate in spite of all its reality disadvantages. To this internal necessity to cripple the Ego is added the restriction of its actual field of experience by anxiety prohibitions and the distortion of the reality it can test by fantasy, so that it is hardly surprising that serious impoverishment of the personality sometimes occurs. It is convincingly clear in these cases that the process of getting well and of ego-strengthening, together with liberation of positive trends, implies a steady increase in the ability to tolerate anxiety and in particular to support the tension of rage and hostility in consciousness. It is as

this becomes possible that the necessity for self-maiming diminishes and the ability to establish positive relations to objects improves.

Very similar conditions obtained in the cases which fell ill after marriage. The more cyclothymic types were in this group. Some had been very successful in their careers prior to marriage. There were certain common features in their reaction to marriage. In the first place they all suffered from an access of guilt relating to the incest meaning of intercourse, but even more to stimulation of their sadism. Their violation revenge-impulses were highly developed, but their attitude was nevertheless contradictory, because at the same time that they were demanding revenge for injuries they were often also expressing disappointment that they were not hurt enough. Real intercourse did not satisfy their primal scene expectations or satisfy their need for punishment. This frustration was mirrored in the calamities with which their Super-ego threatened them after marriage. One extreme case developed obsessions of death with fear of suicide. The disappointment further connected with the kind of husband chosen, who often represented the tender asexual father and who was thus safe enough to marry, but not brutal or sensual enough to be satisfying. They seem to belong to the type described by Deutsch (5) ' in which sexual sensation depends on the fulfilment of masochistic conditions ', who have ' to choose between finding bliss in suffering or peace in renunciation '. Ambivalence was marked where the husband combined maternal with paternal characters, but it was even greater where the choice was plainly narcissistic. Husbands who fell short of parent ideals seemed on the whole less viciously hated than those who failed to satisfy ego-ideals. Ambivalence was continually reinforced by lack of satisfaction in intercourse. This was aggravated in some instances by faulty technique, but the Super-ego prohibition of pleasure and the cannibalistic cathexis of the vagina seemed to be too strong for the soundest technique. Having a child in these cases generally meant continuation of the guilt and ambivalence on to the child. The sublimation values of the function of reproduction as described by Deutsch (3, 4) are vitiated to a great extent by this guilt and ambivalence.

Stimulation of masculine trends is marked in these women, penis-envy constellations often coming to light in the form of feelings of rivalry with the husband. Sometimes this rivalry is a repetition of earlier feuds with brothers, but in one case there was a real conviction that the penis ought to have been the wife's based on a fantasy that

the mother had deliberately given the infant's nipple-penis to the father. This unfair favouritism was bitterly resented. It might be said that the non-success of the marriage-relation in these cases lights up homosexual attitudes by regression, and this is borne out in some by behaviour and analytical material, but in others it seems more as if both aspects had been stimulated together. They were so closely coupled that rousing one meant rousing the other.

These women are often exceedingly sensitive on the question of financial dependence which they regard as a branding in of their inferiority, but behind this there is an enormous burden of guilt relating to the wish to be completely sustained by the husband as they were by the mother. In one case, in which the husband had incurred heavy expenses through his wife's illness and she had lost her earning capacity, she had by this means staged her revenge both on a father who had brought her up to be self-supporting and on a mother who had reared her on a bottle, but she was so guilty about it that her expensiveness was a stimulus to thoughts of suicide. She ought to die before she had exhausted all her husband's resources. This woman had never been very happy, but she had been very successful in her work prior to marriage and had enjoyed what seemed to her all the advantages of a man's life plus certain perquisites belonging to her womanhood, without the disadvantages of either. Her masochism asserted itself from time to time, but she was not ill while she was leading this aim-inhibited combined homo-hetero life. Another woman, much less dangerously masochistic, had a very promising career as a school teacher which circumstances obliged her to give up when she married. In her case the loss of this outlet seemed to play an important part in precipitating illness.

The mention of this last case brings us to a consideration of the rôle of sublimation in these lives, using sublimation in its widest general sense. There seem to be two types of relation, roughly corresponding to the two groups of cases. In the one, sublimations are present, but impaired and inhibited together with the sexuality. The freeing of both proceeds more or less simultaneously as repressions yield, but it is as much dependent on the release of the aggressive as of the libidinal components. In the other sublimation is carried on with considerable success so long as no manifest sexual life is attempted. It seems to be permitted on condition that the whole sexual life is suppressed, but the super-ego permit is cancelled when guilt is increased by overt sexual activity. It often seems that a given sublimatory

activity is checked because of its sadistic drives. That is to say there is a certain amount of evidence here that fusion of aggressive and libidinal components is unfavourable to sublimation. On the other hand, there is also evidence that a sublimation is most useful both to the world and to the psyche which carries a high charge of aggression. In the case mentioned above, teaching successfully employed a high percentage of the patient's sadism and the loss of this constructive outlet for aggression facilitated a breakdown. Again, when a sublimation which has been impeded on account of sadism is freed, no defusion of erotic and aggressive impulses occurs. The only difference appears to be that sadism is tolerated where before it was intolerable. Thus a speaker becomes able to attack and hold her audience instead of keeping a wall between herself and them for mutual protection. The motive of restitution was strong in most of these instances (33).

The fantasy content of the sublimations derived from all the pregenital and genital levels. Activity which seemed at first to represent symbolic male activity usually revealed a feminine side as well. Thus singing might be an expression of potency, especially urinary potency, a stream of song, but it was also giving birth to a decidedly anal baby, a full rounded note. The activities lost none of their symbolic significance when this was brought to light, and this seems rather a ground for questioning the validity of the concept of desexualization. The impression here is more of a freeing of sexuality rather than of any change in nature of the energies involved. On the other hand, it was noticeable that sublimations were largely suspended during the periods in which the most closely associated fantasies were coming to the surface. Presumably energy cannot flow in two directions at once, so that simultaneous cathexis of primary and secondary or symbolic objects must be very difficult. If success in sublimation depends on a high concentration of drive in the symbolic activity, this condition may be difficult of fulfilment in women and may have a bearing on the relative frequency of failure in sublimation.

The impressions derived from these cases may be summarized as follows :—

Firstly, that there is no lack of drive in women towards the dissolution of the Œdipus complex. On the contrary, the drive provided by combination of violation and revenge anxieties is often so strong that it defeats its object.

Secondly, that the excessive strength of this anxiety is correlated with accentuation of sado-masochistic impulses, originating in the oral

phase, and that certain traumatic influences, such as the conjunction of primal scene experiences with premature oral frustration, may be important here. That is to say, that while there is abundant evidence in these cases of re-animation of pre-genital phases by regression, there is also evidence that primary disturbance of oral development is one of the most important factors in the later emergence of genital difficulties. The fettering of development is due to aggression, active or passive, so that if one wished to think in terms of a death instinct one could conceive of it as acting here as the force of inertia in the psychic life, the tendency to fixation.

Thirdly, that masculinity in women is by no means entirely regressive. There is a primary masculinity which has to be, not suppressed, but co-ordinated with feminine impulses, but which may very easily become exaggerated as a means of defence against femininity. The bisexual symbolic content of sublimation is evidence for the normality of this co-ordination of male and female sexual drives, and it would appear to have a physiological counterpart in the relation of clitoral to vaginal function.

Fourthly, that super-ego development is frequently arrested in women at a pre-genital stage, and that this may be responsible for a number of character peculiarities, such as undue dependence upon personal influences and other forms of defence against self-hatred.

Finally, there is nothing in most of these situations which is peculiar to women in the sense that it has no counterpart in male psychology. It is clear that many men have difficulties due to oral conflicts, to failure in co-ordination of hetero- and homo-sexual interests and to archaic Super-ego formations. What would seem to be specific in women is not any psychic drive as such, but the balance which has to be achieved and maintained in order to produce an integrated feminine personality. A distribution of cathexes which is normal in women will be abnormal in men. Sachs (30) gave a clue to this difference in norm when he remarked that oral phantasies occur in relatively normal women to an extent only found in definitely pathological types in men. Whether or not this implies an actual quantitative increase of oral libido in women it surely means that a woman has to retain a degree of oral cathexis which would be excessive in a man. In other words, she must keep her mouth-anus-vagina displacement series functional at a concrete or body level, whereas in the male this type of energy is more completely available for symbolization and can be freely sublimated without impairing genital efficiency. Roughly speaking the man can

concentrate his body cathexes on the nipple-penis series and can as a rule sublimate the fæces-child end of this, but the woman must keep both the series open if she is to fulfil both her sexual and her reproductive functions. Presumably the impetus to integration along feminine lines must be a psychic correlate of the physiological factors which determine the development of the corresponding female body, but the only differences which we can register clinically seem to be differences in integration of drives common to both sexes. If we ever achieve a psychological definition of femininity it looks as if it might have to be a definition in terms of types of integration.

REFERENCES

1. Abraham, Karl: 'Manifestations of the Female Castration-Complex'. *Selected Papers on Psychoanalysis*, p. 338. Hogarth Press, 1920.
2. Bryan, Douglas: 'Bisexuality'. This JOURNAL, 1930, XI, p. 150.
3. Deutsch, Helene: '*Zur Psychologie der weiblichen Sexualfunktionen*'. Int. Psa. Verlag., 1925.
4. Deutsch, Helene: 'The Psychology of Women in Relation to the Functions of Reproduction'. This JOURNAL (passim), 1925, VI, p. 405.
5. Deutsch, Helene: 'The Significance of Masochism in the Mental Life of Women'. This JOURNAL, 1930, IX, p. 48.
6. Ferenczi, Sandor: *Hysterie und Pathoneurosen*, S. 15. Int. Psa. Verlag.
7. Freud, Sigm.: *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex*, pp. 77–8. *Nervous and Mental Disease Mon. Series*, New York and Washington, 1930, 4th ed.
8. Freud, Sigm.: 'On Narcissism: an Introduction', 1914. *Collected Papers*, IV, pp. 45–7.
9. Freud, Sigm.: 'The Psycho-Analysis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman', 1920. *Collected Papers*, II, p. 202.
10. Freud, Sigm.: 'The Passing of the Œdipus Complex', 1924. *Collected Papers*, II, pp. 274–5.
11. Freud, Sigm.: 'Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes'. This JOURNAL, 1927, VIII, p. 133.
12. Freud, Sigm.: 'Female Sexuality'. This JOURNAL, 1932, XIII., p. 281.
13. Glover, Edward: 'Grades of Ego Differentiation'. This JOURNAL, 1930, XI, p. 1.
14. Glover, Edward: 'Sublimation, Substitution and Social Anxiety'. This JOURNAL, 1931, XII, p. 263.

15. Lampl, J., de Groot: 'The Evolution of the Œdipus Complex in Women'. This JOURNAL, 1928, IX, p. 332.
16. Hárnik, J.: 'The Various Developments undergone by Narcissism in Men and Women'. This JOURNAL, 1924, V, p. 66.
17. Horney, Karen: 'On the Genesis of the Castration Complex in Women'. This JOURNAL, 1924, V, p. 50.
18. Horney, Karen: 'The Flight from Womanhood'. This JOURNAL, 1926, VII, p. 324.
19. Jones, Ernest: 'The Early Development of Female Sexuality'. This JOURNAL, 1927, IX, p. 332.
20. Klein, Melanie: 'Infant Analysis'. This JOURNAL, 1926, VII, p. 31.
21. Klein, Melanie: 'Early Stages of the Œdipus Conflict'. This JOURNAL, 1928, IX, p. 167.
22. Klein, Melanie: 'Infantile Anxiety Situations reflected in a Work of Art and in the Creative Impulse'. This JOURNAL, 1929, X, p. 436.
23. Klein, Melanie: 'The Importance of Symbol Formation in the Development of the Ego'. This JOURNAL, 1930, XI, p. 24.
24. Müller, Josine: 'A Contribution to the Problem of Libidinal Development of the Genital Phase in Girls'. This JOURNAL, 1932, XIII., p. 361.
25. Müller-Braunschweig, C.: 'The Genesis of the Feminine Super-ego'. This JOURNAL, 1926, VII, p. 359.
26. Ophuijsen, J. H. W. van: 'Contributions to the Masculinity Complex in Women'. This JOURNAL, 1924, V, p. 39.
27. Payne, Sylvia: 'Observations on the Formation and Function of the Super-Ego in Normal and Abnormal Psychological States'. *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1927, VII, p. 77.
28. Riviere, Joan: 'Womanliness as a Masquerade'. This JOURNAL, 1929, X, p. 303.
29. Sachs, Hanns: 'The Wish to be a Man'. This JOURNAL, 1919, I, p. 262.
30. Sachs, Hanns: 'One of the Motive Factors in the Formation of the Super-Ego in Women'. This JOURNAL, 1929, X, p. 39.
31. Searl, Nina: 'The Flight to Reality'. This JOURNAL, 1929, X, p. 280.
32. Searl, Nina: 'Danger Situations of the Immature Ego'. This JOURNAL, 1929, X, p. 34.
33. Sharpe, Ella: 'Certain Aspects of Sublimation and Delusion'. This JOURNAL, 1930, XI, p. 12.

REGRESSION AND PROJECTION IN THE SUPER-EGO.[1]

BY

E. WEISS

ROME

Long before we understood the structure of the super-ego we had, as it were, caught a glimpse of its contours. The gradual unravelling of threads in our knowledge of the Œdipus complex, which was discovered at the outset of psycho-analytical research but whose full import could not immediately be grasped, led Freud logically to the discovery of this psychic institution. After clinical experience had established the existence and nature of the super-ego, it was possible to fit it in with his views on the primal epoch of the father-horde, the fateful slaying of the father, the organization of the brother-clan and, finally, totemistic culture, etc. His findings on these subjects developed into a history of the evolution of human society, culminating in the formation of the super-ego. The understanding of this has been further assisted by Freud's contribution to biological theory, namely, the theory of instinct. According to Freud's view, which has been fruitfully applied in many fields by his pupils, especially by Reik and Alexander, the instinctual energy employed by the super-ego in its punishment-tendencies (auto-aggression) is energy which was originally directed to the external world; but since it was inhibited in its external workings, it was forced to turn back upon the self.[2] To Freud's conception of the formation of the super-ego, according to which it originates in the identification of the ego with the father (the individual's own past, authority), there was thus added the notion that the part of the ego thus formed operates with the energy of the destructive instinct, derived from the id. The excessive severity of the super-ego is so inflexible and so little amenable to influence precisely because it

---

[1] Based on a paper read before the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society, December 11, 1930.

[2] I would add that the death-instinct is originally *medial* in character; in so far as it is turned outwards it becomes active and may subsequently become reflexive. The difference between the unconscious tendency to self-aggression (which proceeds from the super-ego) and the conscious inclination to suicide is topographical. Both, however, are reflexive. I am here applying to the death-instinct the term ' medial ', introduced by Federn to describe primary narcissism.

draws its nourishment from the biologically primary death-instinct. We must also say of the narcissistic love of the ego for itself that it derives its energy from the instinctual sources of the id, its Eros, just as the impulse of self-destruction draws on the id's death-instinct. Thus, whilst the conditions under which self-hate and self-love arise depend on the behaviour of the father (the authority), the strength of the instinctual energy operative in them is derived from the instinctual sources within the subject himself ; it could not indeed be otherwise.

The existence of the super-ego was deduced from its effects : from inhibitions of instinct, from self-betrayal, from the need for punishment, etc. In the psychoses it sometimes manifests itself yet more plainly, above all in the self-reproaches of the melancholic, in delusions of reference and in various auditory hallucinations in which the patient hears dictated aloud to him everything that he is doing and intends to do. As Freud has shewn, these auditory hallucinations correspond to the so-called ' voice of conscience : ' this control of the self, originally external and subsequently internalized, has once more been projected into the outside world. I still use the term *projection*, although it does not really explain the true position of affairs. What happens in such auditory hallucinations is that the super-ego emerges into consciousness in a psyche which has partly or wholly broken off its relation to reality.

Freud's most important pronouncement on the origin of the super-ego is that it proceeds from an identification. That is to say, the super-ego is an introject. Now I should like to raise the question : is it in fact *only* an introject, i.e. a formation arrived at *solely* by identification ? Before I adduce clinical material to assist this enquiry, it seems necessary to sum up in a few words what we can say about identification in general.

We know from many of Freud's writings that the child's earliest expression of affective attachment to another person is identification. When a child loves someone he wishes to be like him. This tendency may be conceived of as a composite formation of narcissism and object-love. First and foremost the child loves himself ; when another person attracts his libido, he must become that person in order after all to rescue back for himself the libido thus parted with. This other person whom the child loves and wishes to be like is his ego-ideal. It is this tendency to identification which prompts children to learn to talk, how to behave, etc.

This form of object-relation, in which the love given to the object

is recovered by the subject by way of secondary narcissism, persists even later in life side by side with other forms of love-relation. In the later period the only way of recovering the libido is by taking possession, by incorporating the love-object, i.e. when the subject seeks to recover the libido which he has directed towards objects, he must take these themselves into the bargain. This, at least, is my interpretation of the matter. In order to secure union with the object-libido, the individual must unite himself with the object itself, whilst the original identification is not a *real* taking possession, but only a *psychic* introjection of the object.

The child who identifies himself with his father tries therefore to be exactly like him—the father is his model. Identification with him may, however, also signify obedience, docility, for in many respects the father by his behaviour demonstrates to the child *what he wishes him to be like.* But ' what the father wishes the child to be like ' is not the same as ' what the child himself wishes to be like '. For the father is also powerful and independent, and the child, pursuing his narcissistic aims, wishes to be the same. The father occupies a special position in relation to the mother and the child wants to do the same. Thus we see that the identification of the ego with the father is based on two factors. It signifies in certain aspects obedience and the tendency to conform to the *conditions of his love* in order to be loved by him ; but for this purpose one must not identify oneself with him in *every* respect. Secondly, the identification signifies the striving to be the father himself, i.e. to supersede him, to take his place, to *do away with him.* In the unconscious, superseding is equivalent to doing away with. Thus in this second sense the identification of the ego with the father is equivalent to murder of him. Therefore the very identification with the father embodies the primal crime. Identification, then, serves ambivalent trends. The question suggests itself whether the same process which signifies a repetition of the primal crime can simultaneously give rise to the super-ego, or at least whether this process *alone* does so. It is certainly clear that there must be a close connection between the formation of the super-ego and the primal crime. But here we must ask another question, namely : is introverted aggression the sole explanation of the power of the super-ego ?

A large number of practical findings has led me to devote closer consideration to the problem of the super-ego, and I think I have come upon certain new facts which I shall put forward in this paper. For this purpose I shall proceed as if I had to discover this institution for

the first time. I will take as my starting-point the analysis of conscious, concrete feelings of guilt in relation to particular persons.

One of my patients was able to reconcile with his moral views (which, as he himself put it, were derived from ' logical thought ') the perpetration of a theft in a certain very special case. At the same time he was far from being uninhibited in other respects. Now as he was carrying out his premeditated deed in detail, there rose up in his mind with almost hallucinatory distinctness the picture of his father, watching him, although his judgment told him that his father would never know anything about this deed ; in fact, it always remained a secret. When he had done the deed, it seemed to him for some time that the whole world was changed, i.e. unreal : houses, people, vehicles, everything seemed strange, and voices and other noises had a totally different sound. Something in him refused to admit the perceptual world as actually existing ; for the theft which he had committed was now an actual fact, followed by an inner tension (whose nature we must examine) which the patient could not endure ; hence he had to deny the perpetrated act. If the perceptual world were not an actuality but merely a dream, then the theft also would not actually have taken place.[3]

Later, when the patient met his father, he experienced that inner uneasiness which we call a ' sense of guilt '. His father, who suspected nothing, was just as affectionate to him as before ; the patient knew that nothing was more remote from his mind than any suspicion of

---

[3] Here we recognize the mechanism of amentia, which arises because the individual is unable to tolerate a too unpleasant actuality and consequently breaks off his relation to reality. The sense of alienation mentioned above might be construed as a very weak, abortive symptom of amentia. But the psychology of this symptom does not tell us by what mechanism the feeling is produced. From the metapsychological standpoint it is possible that such cases, where the sense of alienation is due to psychodynamic rather than libidinal-economic factors (exhaustion of the libido-reserves), are determined by the process described by Federn, in which a definite part of the ego-frontier is divested of libido. Further it may be added that in amentia reality is warded off by an alteration in what stands for the outside world within the mind, by the drawing-in of the object-libido from that world and the substitution of wish-phantasies ; whilst in the case of the sense of alienation the warding-off is done by withdrawal of libido from the ego-boundaries. Hence amentia goes further than the sense of alienation.

his theft. It distressed him greatly that his father was according him love and respect to which he had ' no right '. True, he regarded this feeling as irrational; for this special case of theft, committed in very peculiar circumstances, did not appear to him as anything wrong or despicable. But his father would have been very indignant with him and would have despised him for it. The patient retained his father's respect *only* because the latter knew nothing of what had happened, and this seemed unbearable. The only solution for his mental discomfort would have been for his father to learn of the theft. He would indeed, the patient felt, have understood the act, committed as it had been, ' in peculiar circumstances ', i.e. he could not have disapproved of it; even if at first he could not help condemning it, at least a reconciliation must have followed. The patient felt that his father's love and respect must be based on truth and frankness, i.e. must be merited.[4]

Before going more deeply into this case let us consider the more superficial explanations which may be suggested for this sense of guilt. Take for instance the need to be rid of the dread of detection. When one person gives something to another under the *mistaken* belief that it is due to him, what comes first psychologically is the recipient's acceptance of what is offered in spite of his having no right to it. But there now arises the possibility that the person who has given the thing in question by mistake may discover his mistake and take it away from the recipient or may even demand compensation. This possibility gives rise to an inner uneasiness in the person who accepts something that does not rightly belong to him, for he cannot help thinking that the other may discover his error. The same applies to committing punishable actions in general. The person who commits them may be detected; his realization of this possibility makes him uneasy. In *Civilization and its Discontents* Freud says (pp. 107/8):

[4] I would note here that many people become habituated to situations involving such a sense of guilt; they grow ' thick-skinned ', as we say, and commit with ever-increasing lightheartedness and absence of inhibition acts condemned by society, especially if they are never detected. Others, on the contrary, are so overwhelmed psychically by the first act that they once and for all give up the ides of repeating it. The former type of behaviour, however—to which I will recur later—very often constitutes the starting-point of an obsessional neurosis: a dormant, simultaneous ambivalence may be turned into an alternating one, or there may ensue an actual defusion of instinct.

' Consequently such people habitually permit themselves to do any bad deed that procures them something they want, if only they are sure that no authority will discover it or make them suffer for it ; their anxiety relates only to the possibility of detection. Present-day society has to take into account the prevalence of this state of mind.'

But we know that there may be yet another factor in the case. We say that our patient was certain that his father would never find out about the theft, but we cannot entirely rely on this certainty of his. How can we completely exclude the possibility that such a fear may be present in his unconscious ? When he had such a vivid picture of his father whilst committing the theft, perhaps he was merely fearing that his father might learn of it. It would then be quite understandable that in order to escape from the tension he should wish to bring the deed to his father's knowledge ; this knowledge would clear up the situation and the patient himself would be rid of the fear which caused the tension. Of course the most desirable solution would then be at length a reconciliation with his father. But this apparently rational train of thought ignores the facts. In very many cases we see that the ' sense of guilt ' does not always correspond to the actual danger of detection, but sometimes exists even where there is no such danger, as, for example, when a person has a guilty feeling in relation to someone who is dead. So the matter is not so simple.

It is certain that the fear of detection does play a great part, but besides this we have found an inner psychic factor at work which has no rational connection with the dread of discovery. This second factor remains hidden from the ego, which merely feels its effect, so that sometimes the ego fails to distinguish it from the dread of detection. But this is only a kind of rationalization ; in the mental state we are investigating the subject over-estimates the possibilities of detection ; the outcome may even be a mechanism resembling phobia.

In the case before us the principal factor in the psychic situation described was the vivid picture of the father, watching (and, we can no doubt add, blaming). *The patient's father was psychically present.* But it by no means follows from this fact alone that the psychic presence of the father was based on an identification of the son with him. Nevertheless, from a father so vividly imagined (or hallucinated) the subject's own inner life cannot remain hidden ; in this way too the feeling of being seen by the ' eye of God ' may arise. Psycho-analysis teaches us—a point specially stressed by Alexander—that the

omniscience of that father whom we carry in our psyche extends so far that he even understands symbolism, the language of the unconscious; we know that at times he causes (I am inclined to say 'reflexly') the inhibition of functions which have a symbolical significance, as for instance in writer's cramp, abasia, astasia, etc., whilst the meaning of these inhibitions remains completely hidden from the ego.

Now let us turn to a second case, in which we can penetrate further into the psychology of conscience.

A patient told me that in early puberty he used to secure sexual gratification in the following way. Having once had the experience of a dream in which he knew that he was dreaming, he thought it would be simple and safe to assault sexually the women he met in his dreams. He often went to sleep with this intention, and sometimes he succeeded in finding himself 'in the dream-world', knowing quite well that he was dreaming. But we shall see that this knowledge did not altogether see him through: it was only a partial knowledge. In his 'dream-world' he went in search of women and girls, wandering through room after room and street after street. But it was not in his power to find what he sought. Indeed, if he did meet a woman, she prepared to defend herself as soon as she perceived the dreamer's intention. Thus he was not even in dreams entirely master of the situation: against his will his conscience made itself felt here too, and only by cunning could he sometimes approach his goal, which, however, he never quite reached before waking up with a pollution. In this connection I may say that as a child he often wanted to satisfy his sexual curiosity with his nursemaids, but they always fended him off. The difficulties which he encountered in his dreams were probably connected with the repressed dread of the female genital, but this is of little importance in our present context. What is far more interesting is that his designs in his dreams were often foiled in another way, namely, by the *apparition of his mother* who, against his will, often rose before him in a dream and looked at him reproachfully, just as she had done in his childhood when she found that he had wetted his bed. Here we have an illustration of the fact that the guilt felt on account of pubertal onanism is a continuation of that relating to infantile masturbation. And although the dreamer knew that he was dreaming, he took the hallucinatory figure of his mother in full earnest and felt compelled in her presence to desist from his sexual aggressions. Only in the waking state could he recollect that she also was only part of the dream. Disregarding

for the moment other over-determining factors, we can easily recognize in the inhibiting, fear-inspiring figure of the mother something exactly analogous to the vivid image of the father of our first patient. We shall recognize, too, that the hallucinatory mother, who even in the waking state still remained as a vivid picture, was a most powerful figure and imposed her will imperiously, as though she were not merely imaginary but had a real existence. The dreamer, who knew that he was dreaming, behaved as if a piece of reality, his real mother, had broken into his dream.

We are reminded here of the phase of ' omnipotence of thoughts ', in which thoughts have a magical power of creating things.[5] But the thought with creative effect imposes itself upon the ego against its will. The idea of the person who forbids often indeed remains quite unconscious but operates nevertheless. The inner tension which proceeds from the powerful, unconscious idea of the person of authority produces in the waking ego with its faculty of judgement an attitude which is roughly represented by the following conditional proposition : ' If *he* knew this, then this or that would happen . . . ' The ego at the same time behaves as if ' he ' already knew or must soon find out, though in reality this may be impossible. There are people who will do certain things, e.g. observe religious ordinances, simply as a matter of ' pious duty ' towards the dead (especially their parents). The phrase : ' If he knew it, he would turn in his grave ' is a very common one. The real ego knows that this cannot happen ; but what it does not know is that the imago created in the unconscious by phantasy knows everything and accompanies it constantly, like a being that actually exists and is capable of feeling anger or giving comfort.

The psychic presence of a person against whose will we have acted may also announce itself acoustically. A patient once told me that, when he was quite a young man, he was one day being taken by some companions to a place of ill-fame, when he thought he heard his mother's voice, weeping. In treating patients I have often made use of this knowledge of the psychic presence of imagos controlling the

---

[5] Strictly speaking, we could only talk of ' production by magic ' where the result attained was real and not merely psychic. Nevertheless I am keeping the word ' magic ' in order to stress the fact that human beings behave towards a psychic presence as though it were a real one. Hence, that which is magically produced has almost the value of reality.

ego. For instance, a patient once displayed a very strong resistance to telling me something. After I had succeeded in inducing her to speak, I interpreted her resistance by saying to her that we had not been alone in the room when she told me the matter in question. To her terrified question: 'Why, who was there?' I replied: 'Your husband, your brothers and your parents' (her father had been dead many years). She understood me at once. True, the members of her family had been present only in her phantasy, but nevertheless they had caused her inhibitions.

On another occasion I wanted to make clear to an unmarried patient, who had experienced severe inhibitions when secretly meeting a young man, whence these inhibitions came, and I told her that the two of them had been seen. 'Yes, by the eye of God', she said promptly. The eye of God is an allegorical image for those human beings whom we carry within us psychically.

We must now enquire why a man against his conscious will conjures up and endows with life the ideas (imagos) of those people against whose wishes and expectations he is acting. The answer is as follows: *The id desires the existence of the persons in question*, whether the ego knows of the wish or not. *The id loves these persons.* When they rise up, whether consciously or unconsciously, this is the effect of a vehement unconscious wish which is gratified hallucinatorily, as in dreams. But this answer at once suggests a second question: Why does the id long for the (consciously or unconsciously) beloved person *precisely* when we are going counter to his demands and expectations? The answer is: we wish only for what we lack. Action contrary to the beloved person's demands was evidently for the id equivalent to doing away with him. By such behaviour one denies him, treats him as if he were not there. For the id this is as if that person had thereby ceased to exist, and because the beloved person is no longer there, one longs for him. Evoking his image is an attempt to undo the act of murder. But here we must bear in mind also the economic factor: when the longing for an object has been kept suppressed by a contrary impulse, the wish makes itself felt again when the intensity of that impulse has diminished in consequence of partial or complete gratification.

I have constantly found with neurotics that when the idea of a certain person produces remorse, this idea emerges the more readily, the more libido the id happens to be directing towards this person at the moment, and the more nearly the transgression of his commands is equivalent to his removal (murder). Perhaps psycho-analytical

material obtained from criminals would make this point even clearer, but I can only cite what I have.

A woman who carried on an affair experienced a sense of guilt in relation to her husband only when he was good and kind to her. Then, the tormenting image of her ' good, innocent, trusting, unsuspecting ' husband rose up in her mind when she was with her lover, and she was inhibited in her relations with him. If, however, her husband had been rude and inconsiderate, her enjoyment was untroubled and the thought of him never crossed her mind. Thus it depended on her love-relation to him at the moment whether the idea of him presented itself or not.

Another woman was able to have sexual intercourse with her lover almost without any sense of guilt, but she could not bring herself to address him by the familiar ' *du* '. If she tried to do so, or if his endearments reminded her too strongly of those of her husband, the image of the latter promptly rose up in her mind. This particular thing was reserved for him ; he must not be altogether replaced by another man. *The replacement of one person by another is for the id equivalent to killing the former.* When this woman attempted thus to do away with her husband she felt remorse, the longing for him awoke in her, and then he appeared to her. The appearance or non-appearance of the image of her husband depended on whether she had killed him or spared him.

As we know, Freud has described the process : killing of the object —remorse—longing for it—setting of it up within the ego. These supplementary remarks of mine have reference to the final act. Instead of ' setting up within the ego ' we have here ' magical creation of the object through the omnipotence of thought '.

I have frequently been able to verify that for our unconscious the substitution of one person for another is equivalent to doing away with the latter. A woman who had just been unfaithful to her husband for the first and last time had the following dream : ' She woke up next morning in their bed at home and saw, instead of her husband, her lover. Her little daughter came into the room to wish her parents good morning as usual. The dreamer said to the child : " Go along, Else, give Daddy a kiss ; you see this gentleman is your Daddy now." As she said this, she felt grieved to the heart and had a sense of unspeakable pity for her little daughter, because she had robbed the poor child of her beloved father and forced a strange man on her.' The mother's mental distress was so great that she awoke and rejoiced that it had only been a bad dream.

There are patients who regard the acceptance of the analytical interpretations as a betrayal of their father, a replacing of the paternal authority by an opposition party. If we succeed in inducing such patients to change their views on various points, they feel unconsciously that they are being seduced into killing their father (or their relations in general), i.e. into doing the very thing from which they wanted to guard themselves most. The result is an increase in their unconscious sense of guilt. One of my patients with a severe obsessional neurosis was visited, after the first results of analysis had been obtained, by an obsessional impulse to murder his father with an axe. I have a large amount of material to the same effect. Without going into further clinical data here I will sum them up by saying that I try to bring into the consciousness of such patients their attitude towards the treatment. If I succeeded in making it clear to them that the real, serious acceptance of analysis signified to their unconscious the killing of the father, even those patients could be cured whose sense of guilt would otherwise have prevented recovery. This shows of what vital importance it is whether the constituted authority assents to the analysis or not.

* * * * *

The magical creation of the love-object which has been done away with has various consequences ; the imago thus created stands in a certain relation on the one hand to the instinctual forces and on the other to the real object whose mental image it is. Actions which can be committed only in the absence of a certain person, because he would hinder them or at any rate disapprove of them and because the subject must anticipate a loss of love or a punishment, are for the id equivalent to doing away with that person. There are various degrees of such ' doing away with ', of which a different view is taken by different individuals. As I have already said, whenever one person is supplanted by another, especially when his relations with the subject are particularly intimate, it is for the unconscious as if the former person had been done away with, i.e. destroyed, and every evidence of that destruction arouses compensating love. ' Of course, as mentioned at the beginning, a person is also held to be done away with when one puts *oneself* in his place. Apart from the sense of guilt aroused in many patients through the transference to the analyst (substitution of the analyst for the father) we observe that, even towards the end of the psycho-analytic treatment, a patient often does not venture to feel grown-up and to practise sexual intercourse, because, if he did so, he

would be like his father. To be grown-up oneself means to be the father, i.e. it means that one has thrust him aside, killed him. Once more we may see here how identification provides a channel of expression for ambivalent feelings.

The magical creation of a love-object is incompatible with the aggressive tendencies directed against it. For this reason the negative impulses which were present in the ambivalent attitude to the real object are in the id held back from the imaged introject, so that the character of the person in question as a love-object is respected; otherwise his image could not appear—the source of its appearance in the capacity of conscience is therefore Eros. A sense of guilt towards somebody either brings about a defusion of instinct by the mechanism just described, or at least a dormant, simultaneous ambivalence is automatically converted into an alternating one. Great importance must in this connection be attributed to the fact that the ambivalent impulses can now be directed not only towards the real object but also towards its imago, i.e. the idea of it. But we will speak of this more fully later on. At this point I would only add that the simultaneous type of ambivalence manifests itself only in an inhibition, while the alternating type produces symptoms.

When an offence has been committed and the subject provokes the occurrence of that sequel which would have followed had the love-object been present, he affirms the existence of that object instead of denying it. If the patient whom I mentioned early in this paper had stolen in his father's presence and had taken the consequences, he would by so doing have affirmed his father's existence and not ignored him. But every attempt to avoid those consequences and yet to commit the theft could only signify to the unconscious doing away with the father. This is succeeded by his magical resuscitation as a result of intense longing for him; the resuscitation in its turn (and here we have the decisive factor) automatically involves the employment in some other direction of those forces of destruction which had previously found gratification in doing away with the father. The phantasied or hallucinatory imago which has been magically killed can be brought to life again only when one accepts the punishment which it would have inflicted. Here lies the way to the deflection of the aggressive impulses from the object to the self. The instinct of destruction must not be allowed to thwart Eros in its function of re-creating the dead person. Now here we have the much debated mechanism of the need for punishment; it originates in the longing for the love-

object, or rather the inability to do without it. We see then that self-punishment also is an act which ' calls to life ' again the love-object whom the offence did away with. We can understand that the magical-hallucinatory creation of a person must involve a specific appropriate change in the structure of the psyche as a whole.

When a child was threatened that his father would leave him, he replied : ' No, let father be cross with me and stay here '. Since we try to re-create the love-object as it really was, it must behave in our phantasy exactly as it would have done in reality, if the offence committed had been discovered. If we order a portrait of some beloved relative who has died, we are not satisfied with one which is only approximately like him, even if it is more beautiful than the real object ; we want that object as it really was.

Another factor which must be considered is our attitude to the real person towards whom we feel guilty. To the patient we first mentioned it was extremely distressing still to receive the love and esteem of the real father, who knew nothing about the theft, whilst the father-imago,[6] who knew all, had withdrawn his love from him. It seems then that we have a tendency to *make the real object coincide with its psychic image within us.* How are we to explain this tendency ? A discrepancy in the behaviour of the real object disturbs for our id the image which it has magically created. The offender tends to behave to the real object as if his guilt were known ; this, however, is contradicted by the ego's faculty of applying the test of reality. This faculty combats the sense of the identity of introject (imago) and real object, which seeks to impose itself in defiance of all our reason. If the balance of forces is unfavourable the test of reality may be overborne. Otherwise the ego with its power of insight is perfectly aware that the object knows nothing of the offence committed behind its back ; the feeling that nevertheless it does know has its origin in a repressed level of the ego. Making use of an expression of Federn's I should say that the object, because it lies outside an earlier boundary of the ego, is not kept apart from the idea of it. We must relegate the omnipotence of thought to an archaic ego with this earlier boundary-line. The tension between the above process of magical creation, which occurs within the old ego-boundary (and of which the higher ego knows nothing), and the test of reality applied by the rational judgement of the higher ego gives rise to the feeling which people have in mind when

---

[6] I use the word ' imago ' in the same sense as ' introject '.

they say that they feel ' guilty towards a certain person '. The result is a sense of inhibition in the face of his demonstrations of affection as though they were not sincere ; on the other hand one expects to be repulsed by him. It is well known that after a lapse many a conscientious husband finds that his sense of guilt for a time impairs his sexual potency in relation to his wife, as if she had repulsed him.

It is the desire to bring the phantasied introject into accord with the real object which makes it possible for the ' sinner ' to become reconciled with the love-object. If that object *understands and forgives*, the *tension* which has its source in the introject (imago) is *also at an end. This*, in my view, is the *foundation of the compulsion to confess.* If the love-object modifies its demands, allowing what it previously forbade, corresponding gratifications of instinct are thrown open to the individual ; actions which would previously have signified doing away with the love-object in question have now lost this meaning, just because they are henceforth allowed by it.[7]

I said at the beginning that I was taking as my starting-point the

---

[7] A certain familiar experience of animal psychology deserves our careful consideration. It sometimes happens that a dog which has misbehaved itself in its master's absence runs away from him, when he returns, or cowers as if it expected a beating. Dogs very often betray themselves in this way. It seems then that they have some sort of sense of guilt. The dog behaves as if its real master knew of its misdeed. It lacks the power of judgement which would enable it to discriminate. Now if the basis of our sense of guilt in general is to be found in the historical evolution of mankind, in the murder of the father, etc., how can a sense of guilt occur in dogs ? To this question we may answer that we may well suppose that the diminution in the dog's aggressiveness towards its master or human beings in general is connected with a process of introversion of its destructive energy and consequently with something which approximates to the formation of a super-ego. And, further, we must not forget that for many thousands of years, from the Stone Age on, men have kept dogs. From the fierceness and aggressiveness of its nearest relation, the wolf, we must conclude that originally the ancestors of the modern dog tore their masters to pieces, but later, during the process of domestication, managed to develop an ardent love for them. We know that dogs are in a very high degree capable of love. There are cases on record in which a faithful dog could not endure its master's death and pined to death on his grave. Thus in the evolution of the dog also there is some special factor which has led to something akin to the formation of a super-ego.

analysis of specific feelings of guilt in relation to particular persons, without for the moment considering the super-ego as a whole. I would only remind you that the introject whose influence we see at work in the super-ego varies from occasion to occasion according to the love-object which has just been symbolically killed (in the sense described) : in one instance it is the magically created image of the father or mother, in another that of husband or wife, in a third that of a friend, and so forth. Nevertheless there is only *one* super-ego. I do not agree with Schilder who speaks of many super-egos. My remarks so far have reference only to the psychological mechanism by which a sense of guilt towards a given person arises through the setting-up within the subject of an image of him which controls behaviour.

I have described the sequence : killing—remorse—resuscitation, which occurs whenever a sense of guilt arises in relation to a particular person. Now this process is a repetition which follows an old pattern deeply rooted in the human mind. The true super-ego, that powerful mental institution, is formed only through the ontogenetic renewal, in the individual's earliest childhood, of this primal process in the history of man's evolution. As we know, Freud views the incidents which took place in the primal horde as the phylogenetic prototype of the Œdipus complex and therefore of the formation of the super-ego. I refer to the embittered wish to do away with the primal father, the conflicts arising out of the simultaneous dread of him and love for him, the actual dependence on him in the great needs of life, the final deed by which he was slain and devoured, the remorse which followed the deed and, finally, his magical resuscitation and the so-called projection into the cosmos of his magnified and perfected image, in the form of the divinity whose eye sees all. I shall be able to shew later wherein this projection actually consists. In reproducing these all-important factors in the history of mankind the child's psyche attaches itself to those persons and personal experiences which are the most appropriate, as we see from the analyses of the Œdipus complex of neurotics. But both the process of formation of the super-ego and the super-ego itself remain unconscious, and the unconscious is subject to the primary psychic process. Hence there ensues special effects and mental states which will have to be discussed in another connection.

At the Tenth International Psycho-Analytical Congress (at Innsbruck) Anna Freud stated that in children ' the super-ego has not as yet become rigid but is still accessible to every influence from the

outside world '.[8] A child can still easily alter the conditions under which the sense of guilt is felt, if an authoritative person from the outside world alters the commands previously held binding and allows gratifications of instincts which were formerly forbidden. In controlling their instincts children are still guided far more by regard for real objects than by a super-ego in the strict sense of the term. In so far as this already exists it easily adapts itself to the attitude of the objects. Now it seems to me that in the case of the adult's *conscious* sense of guilt in relation to a particular person the position is still very much the same as in the child: that person's forgiveness or permission causes the sense of guilt towards him to vanish. The problems of the adult's super-ego begin to become more complicated only when the guilt-relation is *not* specifically personal. In that case nothing but a thorough analysis can bring about the disappearance of the guilty feelings, through the excavation of those deep strata in which they have arisen.

We have seen that the idea of a person appears as the institution of conscience when the subject has done away with him (or done something equivalent), but yet loves him and therefore wishes him back. The second part of this statement calls for comment. The ' love ' may vary in its nature or origin, and special consideration must be given to that which originates in identification, because it is socially very important. Human society, as Freud has shewn, is characterised by an identification of the individual members with one another. This identification lends to the social conventions and the established rights of men a special strength ; on this is based the understanding of another person's ego (his ' you-ness ' [*Duheit*]). Without this identification human relations as they actually exist, countless feelings and attitudes such as, for example, compassion,[9] would be impossible. Adler postulates a ready-made community-sense, but we of the school of Freud know that the so-called ' community-sense ' is made up of various factors and can be analysed. Here we are concerned with the love which springs from identification, that love which leads us to speak of another person as our fellow-man. It has created in man's mind the deeply-rooted law of talion, which probably gathered strength in the epoch of social evolution characterized by the brother-clan.

---

[8] Cf. the author's abstract in the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, XIII, 1927, p. 477.

[9] Cf. Jekels : ' Zur Psychologie des Mitleids '. *Imago*, XVI, 1930.

(Cf. in this connection Freud's works: *Totem und Tabu* and *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.*)

In Zola's *Thérèse Raquin* [10] we have a very instructive example of the sense of guilt following on the murder of a fellow-creature. This then is a person who is not loved in the ordinary sense but only with the ' identification-love ' of which I have been speaking, a being, that is to say, to whom we direct such libido as is involved in the attitude by which we feel him to be a ' you with rights equal to our own '. I will reproduce briefly the episode with which we are concerned:

Laurent and Thérèse drown Camille, Thérèse's weakly husband, and marry one another. The author early makes us acquainted with Laurent's character. He is a young man who delightedly anticipates his father's death because the latter refuses to send him any money. Laurent tries to paint pictures of saints, to earn a few pence, but for so very mediocre a painter this is an extremely meagre source of income. After the murder of Camille the passionate love of Thérèse and Laurent, to gratify which they killed him, dies out. They become more and more estranged, avoid one another, and are terribly tormented by the image and indeed the hallucination of the murdered man. Together with Camille they have slain their passion.

We realize that the magical creation of the murdered man was incompatible with the gratification of the love which in life he would have prevented (deferred obedience). To create a love-object the co-operation of one's whole mental attitude is necessary, otherwise the creation fails and the imago is not achieved.

---

[10] This psychologically valuable novel was written in 1867 when the author was twenty-seven. In a conversation with G. Dalma I acquainted him with the meaning of the artistic productions of Laurent which forced themselves upon him against his will, and Dalma treated the episode in detail from the psycho-analytical standpoint in the *Archivio Generale di Neurologia Psichiatria e Psicoanalisi*, edited by Prof. Levi Bianchini, Vol. VIII, f. 4, 1927. He shewed that the murder was a repetition of the slaying of the primal father, an episode psychically re-experienced in the Œdipus situation by every human being.

The phenomenon that murderers are often tormented by the vivid image or hallucination of their victims has also provided a frequent theme for the drama. It offers a great opportunity for the actor and has a powerful effect on the spectator. We may think, for instance, of the gruesome, bloody corpse of Banquo appearing to Macbeth who caused him to be killed.

Laurent then rents a modest studio and tries to paint. A friend who is a connoisseur of art comes to see him and discovers to his astonishment that the heads of two women and three men painted by Laurent are masterpieces ; he can scarcely believe that Laurent is the artist. But he points out that all five pictures resemble one another. True enough : they all resemble the murdered Camille. Laurent realizes that he has looked too long at the drowned body of Camille in the Morgue : the impression has been too strongly printed on his mind. He destroys the pictures and tries to paint heads of old men and girls, but all resemble Camille. He then makes up his mind to paint angels and virgins with haloes, caricatures with distorted features, Roman warriors with helmets on their heads—all in vain. He is not master of his hand when painting ; it always reproduces, in a thousand forms, the features of Camille. Thérèse and Laurent finally commit suicide. They have been driven to it by the imago of Camille.

As I have said, we ought, strictly speaking, to use the term ' magic ' only where reality is actually influenced. But the individual may also be moved to give a material expression to the psychic imago, as Zola has shewn here. Thus, what I call ' magical creation ' finds its natural extension in ' artistic creation ' which has still something of wizardry about it.

* * * * *

Let us see what our results so far can add to our knowledge of the super-ego. While the super-ego itself is unconscious, its origin as the end-result of a sequence of psychological factors is reflected in the occurrence of conscious feelings of guilt and therefore, for the time being, we can extend to the super-ego also the conclusions to which the study of these feelings has led us. Through its manifestations in projection (repetition) we come to know something of the process projected. Later, however, we shall devote special consideration to the super-ego itself.

The first thing which we can say about the so-called ' introjects ' is that they are formed by means of an incomplete act of magical creation, through the ' omnipotence of thought ' which is already familiar to us. In such creation the formation of introjects is not the only method available ; as we have just seen illustrated in Zola's novel, the omnipotent thought may also take on a material expression. Its magical basis first imparts to artistic creation something of wizardry : art is an extension of magic, weakened as regards its claim to reality, but

exalted in its creative achievement. But there are other means, magical in the strict sense of the term, of externalizing in the real world the imagos within us. We shall discuss these in greater detail when considering certain phenomena of schizophrenia (mannerisms, echolalia, echopraxia).

The second factor which requires special emphasis is that the created image, the projected idea of a person, is not distinguished in our unconscious from the real person himself. It is only the real ego with its power of judging and of testing the reality of things which differentiates between the image and the actual person ; nevertheless the identity between the two is preserved in a certain measure in so far as the influence of the underlying stratum continues to make itself felt. I have a visual image of the situation : I picture the space in which this identity exists as surrounded by an envelope ; the envelope alone comes into contact with the outside world. The processes within this space affect the outer, flexible envelope, just as our skin takes on the appearance of convexity or concavity from the organs beneath it. If however the envelope is damaged or wholly destroyed, the difference between thought and reality becomes blurred or entirely blotted out in the mind of the subject. This is the mechanism of paranoid projection. I have had this metaphor of the envelope in mind for many years ; I first mentioned it in an article entitled : ' Über eine noch nicht beschriebene Phase der Entwicklung zur heterosexuellen Libido '.[11] I described it as ' a filter through which only libido could pass '. I had started with the observation that, when the masculine ego abandons a feminine-passive attitude of its own, it seeks in the outside world for an object corresponding to the abandoned introject and, having found it, directs libido towards it in order to effect re-union with it—this time in actuality and not merely psychically. Normally therefore all that is projected is libido and it is projected on to objects in the outside world ; but these objects must be found in reality, i.e. they must have actual existence. The contents of ideas and thoughts is not displaced into the outside world but is retained within. This is how I arrived at the notion of a filter which retains thoughts and ideas and lets libido through. I supposed, further, that an injury to this mysterious filter, allowing thoughts and ideas to pass through, represented the specific mechanism of psychotic projection, i.e. of delusions and hallucinations. In a later article entitled : ' Der

---

[11] *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, XI, 1925, s. 443.

Vergiftungswahn im Lichte der Introjektions-und Projektions-vorgänge ' [12] I again discussed this somewhat vague idea of a filter.

The filter is perhaps connected with the actual ego-boundary, which has a strong libidinal cathexis. This connection throws light also on the mechanism of hallucination and delusion, which occur when the libidinal cathexis of the ego retreats to an earlier ego-boundary (Federn).[13] Through the withdrawal of the ego-boundary earlier ego-levels are restored, the last amongst them being that which Federn calls the ' ego-cosmic ego ', in which there is as yet no differentiation between the object and its idea. Everything still possesses ' ego-quality ' : anything which might be a ' non-ego ' does not as yet exist. (Cf. Freud's remarks on the ' oceanic feeling ' in *Civilization and its Discontents*.)

But even when the normal ego-boundary remains, we detect the continued influence of earlier ego-levels. To Federn again belongs the credit of having discovered that even ego-levels may be repressed. I am entirely in agreement with what he says on the subject. Under the envelope of the actual ego-boundary, with its strong cathexis, there is still active the sphere in which the idea of the object is identical with the object itself. Only thus, as I have said, can the compulsion to confess arise out of the sense of guilt, which would otherwise remain an internal, introjected process.

Let us see what it is which distinguishes the super-ego proper from the other mental images created by the omnipotence of thought. The super-ego is an image of the parents from the individual's own past, created by psychic means. The image in question is that of an omnipotent, omniscient being who controls us, rewards and punishes (especially with castration), bids us inhibit certain instinctual impulses, and is a being which we cannot do without.

The image of the omnipotent father operates in our unconscious, where there is no difference between original and image. In accordance with the psychology of the unconscious the super-ego is thus identical with the object whose image it is. But the object has vanished. The real parents have lost their original importance. The ego with its

---

[12] *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, XII, 1926.

[13] Federn, ' Some Variations in Ego-feeling ', this JOURNAL, Vol. VII, 1926 ; ' Narcissism in the Structure of the Ego ', *ibid.*, Vol. IX, 1928 ; ' Das Ich als Subjekt und Objekt im Narzissmus ', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, XV, 1929.

faculty of judgement and its constantly increasing adaptation to reality has realized that they are as powerless as itself. But their original imago has been repressed and therefore persists unchanged in the unconscious. In most people, however, it breaks through from there (as something entirely disconnected from the memory-pictures of the real parents), sometimes only on occasions when there is a great need for powerful assistance from outside. When it does so, the subject becomes aware of it, for it does actually exist as a psychic reality. But where is the real object in the outside world which is supposed to correspond to it? The real ego, made aware of the existence of this imago but knowing nothing of its origin, does not perceive it in the outside world by the organs of sense; it can only descry it in its manifestations—and this it is which leads to belief in God. *The idea of God, then, has its origin in the unconscious formation which we call the super-ego.* If we wish to be set free from an inhibition imposed by the super-ego or to receive its forgiveness, it is only God who can annul the prohibition or grant forgiveness; the psycho-analyst has not the power. All the events in the life of the individual are attributed to the will of God. An eighteen-months-old baby on falling down called out, 'Naughty Daddy!' Even, however, if the repressed imago of the Almighty does not break through, fate or, often, external authority and public opinion are for our unconscious the same as the super-ego. Many people become more moral when a misfortune befalls them. We are familiar with all this from Freud's writings. For instance, in *Civilisation and its Discontents* (p. 110) he says: "But this is easily explained from the original infantile stage of conscience which, as we thus see, is not abandoned after the introjection into the super-ego, but persists alongside and behind the latter. Fate is felt to be a substitute for the agency of the parents; adversity means that one is no longer loved by this highest power of all, and, threatened by this loss of love, one humbles oneself again before the representative of the parents in the super-ego, which in happier days one had tried to disregard". But when we take into account the magical creation of the super-ego and wish to describe the situation only from the standpoint of the psychology of the unconscious, we must put the matter as follows[14]: The infantile level of conscience persists, but not only

[14] Identification with another person (introjection) is an autoplastic method of giving shape to his imago (the idea of him), as the making of an actual likeness is an alloplastic method. Formation of an imago precedes identification.

alongside and behind the introjection into the super-ego : this original infantile level persists precisely *in* the super-ego. Fate is not merely a *substitute for the parents :* in the unconscious it is *identical with them.* We may say not merely that they are represented in the super-ego, but that it entirely coincides with them. To put the matter in a nutshell : in the unconscious, fate is completely identical with the super-ego and the super-ego with the parents of our early childhood. The compulsion to confess only becomes intelligible if we supplement Freud's statement in this sense.

* * * * *

Taking as my starting-point the views put forward above, I have been able, as I should like to indicate tentatively here, to gain a new angle of approach to three problems of psychopathology—those of obsessional neurosis, melancholia and schizophrenia.

As regards obsessional neurosis, I believe I have recognized that the instinct of aggression picks up from Eros its means of creation, in order to use the same means in its turn to destroy again the imagos which Eros created. I hope that my readers will not take exception to this allegorical personification of the two kinds of instincts. I think I can shew that in obsessional neurosis the subject's aggressive impulses are aimed not against the actual object but against its mental image (introversion). But since that image was formed by magical means, it can be got at only by way of magic. The reason why the manifest symptoms are mostly, but not exclusively, directed against a real object is precisely that in the unconscious that object is not distinguished from its mental image. Cases are by no means uncommon in which a deceased person is the object of obsessional ideas and fears. In one obsessional neurotic it struck me that his ambivalent attitude towards real persons, who cannot be killed magically, did not produce any obsessional symptoms ; on the other hand his ambivalent attitude to the magically created imagos gave rise to obsessional impulses and fears. He lived in constant dread lest by his thoughts some sort of inadvertence, etc., he might kill his relations, against whose imagos his aggression was directed. On one occasion this patient, realizing the bearing of the facts, exclaimed : ' Of course I kill my father in my thoughts, but only the idea of him in my mind, and I confuse him himself with my idea of him ! ' He added that at the same time this image was protected by his love (guardian angel). The doubting mania, the genesis of which Freud has explained, was in this patient unbounded ; it had reference to the uncertainty whether Eros was

powerful enough to create and preserve the imago in the face of the violent onslaughts of the instinct of destruction. Another patient became quite distracted when a photograph of her dead son fell down on the floor. Furthermore, I have often been struck by the fact that the obsessional impulses and thoughts of many neurotics did not make their appearance until actions which would not have been tolerated by a love-object had been performed for the *second* time. On the first occasion the image of the object came into being by the mechanism which I have described (the process of formation of the super-ego was repeated in the projection on to this love-object) : it was only on the second occasion that the subject was disregarding this image. This disregard was unconsciously equated with an aggression, which, in its turn, re-awakened love, and there resulted automatically an alternating ambivalence in relation to the *phantasied* love-object, which in the unconscious is one with the real object. Thereupon the obsessional neurosis broke out.

I saw an opportunity of applying these new findings to melancholia, when I was analysing an acute case, a woman whom I treated for two and a half years with good results. (The improvement has been maintained : her state is now far more normal than it ever was previously in the intervals of remission.) In her melancholic self-accusations this patient upbraided herself with being a prostitute, a bad, egotistical mother who neglected her duties. She charged herself with readiness to give herself to any man who asked her, she felt she was hard, frivolous and incapable of any human feeling. And whilst weeping and lamenting, in helpless despair and crushed by her sense of guilt, she protested that she deserved nothing but death or even the most frightful tortures, she complained that she could no longer feel even any sense of guilt. It may be remarked incidentally that in reality she was a conscientious wife and mother. It was a case of a sense of alienation about her emotional life ; thus, for instance, she did not feel her sense of guilt to be her own. Analysis shewed that her self-accusations were only in part reproaches originally directed against an object. When she reproached herself for having no feeling, she was really complaining that she lacked the organ for feeling, i.e. the penis. Similarly, when she said that she would give herself to any man who asked her, it meant that she wanted to appropriate a penis. She once dreamt outright that her husband came to her and then somehow vanished, but left his penis with her. I cannot here discuss all the material relating to her castration-complex. As a child she was intensely self-

willed and developed a violent envy of the penis ; later she seemed to have adapted herself to womanhood and to have called her sense of humour to her aid in dealing with her masculinity complex. At times she tended to be hypomanic, till suddenly, while still quite young, she became low-spirited and began to weep without being able to give any reason for it. In her analysis, which took place some years later, we found that she believed herself to be castrated by her father, her super-ego or fate (which are all the same thing), and that the meaning of her illness was : ' I am punished ; my father has emasculated me and this is why I can feel nothing. I know that he has not forgiven me yet because I am still a castrated woman. So it must be that I am still bad. What is it that I am guilty of ? I want to rob my husband of his penis and I am refusing to accept the lot which my father has assigned to me, that of being a woman and a mother. I am not a proper woman or a proper mother '.

We will confine ourselves here to the discussion of a few secondary problems of this case, which bear on our subject. First let us ask how it was that the patient sometimes felt herself to be persecuted by her super-ego, whilst at other times she received a sense of comfort from the same institution. This question can be put into more general terms as follows : When a man meets with misfortune, why is it that sometimes he feels his need for punishment to be satisfied and therefore gets a sense of relief, whereas at other times he sees the supposed punishment as a warning which causes him to conform more conscientiously to his moral code ? To answer this question we should have to investigate first the different kinds of reaction displayed by the various ego-types.

I found a similar mechanism in a male analysand who had already made two serious attempts at suicide. He felt that Nature had given his brother an unfair advantage over him, and he was unsuccessful in life because of his inefficiency in various directions, due in part to inhibitions. For him, too, fate, his father and the super-ego were one and the same. He protested that his fate was his own fault, for every man was the architect of his own fortune.

Where the identity between the father, the super-ego and fate is particularly obvious we are dealing with individuals who possess only a very thin covering of libido at their present ego-frontier, whilst more primitive ego-levels have become reactivated. A paranoiac patient, who at first had the greatest confidence in me, dethroned me when he found that I could not shield him from the hard blows of fate. He was

forced to realize that I was not the representative of omnipotent fate. As I have said, even in patients who are not psychotic, phantasies of the analyst's omnipotence play a great part. For instance, one patient demanded in his transference-phantasies that I should possess unlimited social and political power ; since this was not the case, I was no match for his super-ego, as he himself put it. Another patient, who had full insight into the irrational character of the transference-associations which crowded into his mind and was very difficult to persuade to tell me them in spite of their absurdity, finally summed them up as follows : ' After all, who are you ? What business have you to interfere in my intimate personal affairs ? You are not my father. Besides, my father is richer than you are and pays you '. We see that his actual father was still closer to his super-ego than I. It would of course be contrary to the purpose of the treatment to pretend to the patient to be more powerful than one actually is. Our task is to bring him to accept reality.

The relationship of rivalry which patients feel to exist between their personal, individually acquired super-ego (father, authority, public opinion, etc.) and the analyst often produces a negative transference to the latter. A patient of a religious turn of mind once dreamt that a bishop (to whom he had a strong positive transference) was talking to another man who wore glasses and had a fool's cap on his head. I was the other man.

* * * * *

By way of counteracting the instinct of destruction our longing for the love-object creates images of it. The remarkable point about this phenomenon is that the image is endowed with an existence of its own ; it lives and can find fault with us or console us. We know that the imago which constitutes the super-ego is unconscious. If in a concrete case we think of particular persons, their images are, of course, at first entirely conscious, or at any rate preconscious, and display all the characteristics of these systems, even when not linked to verbal ideas, i.e. the names of the persons in question. But when such an imago is repressed, as happens when the super-ego is formed, it becomes detached not merely from any verbal idea ; it can no longer enter consciousness even in the form of the image of the person. We become conscious at most of its displacement-substitute, of the idea of God, of Fate personified or the authority actually encountered later on. Like all the contents of the unconscious, the super-ego is subject to the primary psychic process ; in this connection it is also a point of the

greatest interest that the super-ego makes no distinction in its treatment of behaviour directly governed by instinct and of many substitute-activities which gratify the forbidden impulses by displacement. How this comes about must be considered separately.[15]

The creation of objects by means of the omnipotence of thought is a primitive method but is maintained with astonishing pertinacity even on the later levels of ego-organization. In day-dreams it still plays a dominating part. Artistic creation lends to the product of thought a form perceptible also to others—it is thus that an actual picture comes into being. It is indeed a fact generally known that the true work of art of the painter and the sculptor is a materialization of the imagos presenting themselves to his mind (in poetry and music, also of thoughts and emotions). If no such imagos appear, the artist is unproductive, he must wait till they offer themselves to him. The mere delineator of the outside world, who portrays nothing but what he sees before his eyes (like a photographer), has nothing to do with art. Art is the giving of form to psychic creations which well up from the unconscious. That the camera, like other implements, may also be made to serve the artist's ends, need hardly be mentioned in these days of constant progress in artistic photography.

One of my patients provided me with a very good opportunity of studying the foregoing facts more closely. It was a case of simple depression without melancholic traits (no conscious sense of guilt or self-reproaches). The patient displayed apathy amounting almost to aboulia ; he took no interest in anything except at the most perhaps

---

[15] In order to guard against a possible misunderstanding we must bear in mind the following facts: In the case of specific feelings of guilt in relation to particular persons there is a kind of repetition of the genuine process by which the super-ego was formed in childhood, even if the person in question is identical with the original real prototype of the genuine super-ego, e.g. with the father. The patient whom I first instanced, who after committing a theft became aware of the genesis of his father-imago, had been guilty of an offence against his veritable, actual father in the special case mentioned. But this father was no longer identical with the super-ego acquired by the patient in childhood. Even though there may be a certain relation between the actual father and the super-ego, it is quite certain that the former is not identical with the latter, which in a state of repression persists unchanged in the unconscious. The consequences of offences against the super-ego are quite different from those of offences against the father.

his own paintings. At times he suffered from a torturing sense of *ennui* and he could make no effort to extricate himself from his situation. For this reason analysis could not do much either. It was a matter of indifference to him whether it went on or not. Many an analytic hour passed without his opening his lips. As he himself put it, he was separated from the outside world by an impenetrable isolating layer. His powers of logical thought were of a very high order ; he had a gift of rapid and penetrating apprehension and could grasp the most abstruse philosophical and epistemological problems. His speech was coherent. In short, he displayed none of the symptoms which characterize the schizophrenic's unsuccessful attempts to make contact with the outside world. Communication between Pcs and Ucs was unimpeded. Nevertheless he was a man who had little or no libido left for the outside world ; no strongly cathected ideas of objects rose up in his mind, their imagos did not appear to him. On the other hand there appeared to him incessantly the picture of his own self, his listless, joyless, inert self. Having some talent as a painter he gave pictorial form to this image. When he painted he did so without any preconceived intention. He thought of nothing at all, he painted faithfully what he actually saw in his mind, without reflecting on its details. And always in all his pictures what appeared directly or indirectly was nothing but the imago of his own self.

In this patient we have a case of secondary, i.e. reflexive narcissism. If he had regressed to primary narcissism, which Federn has aptly designated as ' medial ', even the picture of his own self would not have appeared to him. Schizophrenics regress to this level ; their libido withdraws itself from the ideas of objects and they can produce no imagos at all because their id does not wish for the presence of objects. It is true that we know of pictures painted by schizophrenics, but in so far as these are the productions of schizophrenia they lack any ucs cathexes and consist solely of condensations of expressive impulses without any objective content corresponding to reality. We have to ask ourselves what type of expression is involved in such cases. Freud has emphasized that pcs cathexis consists of verbal ideas, but we find (and not only from our investigation of the various phenomena of schizophrenia) that pcs ideas draw on memory-impressions conveyed by other senses besides that of hearing. We must credit Pcs with all forms of expression, not only speech but gesture and mimicry, as well as drawing, painting and sculpture.

Some years ago I had the opportunity of observing the course of a severe case of catatonia with frequent acute attacks of mania. A year after the patient had entered an institution, the clinical picture changed into that of a quiet, fully developed hebephrenia. The most striking manifestations related to his respect for the attendants. This catatonic patient, who had been extremely excited, confused and dirty, became gradually quieter and more orderly and finally could be employed as a good and even reliable helper in many of the duties of the ward. But as he became calmer he developed the most marked mannerisms of speech and gesture. I once asked him why he was so silly and affected ; he replied, always in the same manner, that one of the attendants had told him that if he wanted to get well he must behave properly. I had the impression that his mode of speech and his demeanour were intended to exhibit his ' proper behaviour '. He added that now he really did behave properly and indeed performed the same duties as the attendants. Here his identification with the latter is obvious, but also his submissiveness and obedience to them. The patient's answer was made in a tone of voice impossible to convey but very familiar to psychiatrists. It sounds like derision or mockery, but it is yet something else ; one might also view his identification with the attendants as a kind of caricature, as though he did not take his own remarks seriously. But this again does not hit the mark. (Incidentally let us note that the difference between identification and imitation is merely topographical.)

This case seems to throw some light on the nature of mannerisms ; they originate in surface identifications and in not taking other people seriously. But these identifications are not merely superficial ; they are also quite peculiar. It is, however, difficult to define their nature. When we speak of peculiar, superficial identifications we have in mind also the echolalia and echopraxia of schizophrenics and we shall recognize that these phenomena express an identification with persons in the subject's environment—an identification following directly on the particular stimulus, immediate, but purely formal in character.

We recognize the central core of schizophrenia in the turning away from the object-world ; we should expect, therefore, that those peculiar identifications of schizophrenics, with their foolish air, represent attempts to establish contact again with the outside world. Freud has shewn that in such unsuccessful attempts the schizophrenic effects a cathexis of pcs verbal ideas, since the way to ucs concrete ideas is

blocked.[16] Similarly he invests with libido the other pcs elements of expression without satisfactorily connecting them with the corresponding concrete ideas. Observation shews that these ideas pertaining to other modes of expression, which remain unconnected with concrete ideas of objects, also undergo displacement and condensation, i.e. they succumb to the primary psychic process, which thus produces not only the peculiar mode of speech characteristic of the schizophrenic but also the oddity of his behaviour. The patient who was trying to enter into psychic relation with the attendants could not help behaving all the more as if he were not going to take them seriously and his identifications with them amounted to parody.

The libidinal cathexis of the unconscious ideas of objects is, it is true, only one component of man's complicated object-relations, but it is a component of the utmost importance ; we cannot eliminate it even when our instinct of destruction draws us into hostile action against persons whom we love. When this has occurred, the unconscious idea of them receives a new animation and our longing for them produces those mental images to which I have so often alluded, which see and judge all that goes on within us. Only the schizophrenic who actually loses his object-relations loses at the same time also his super-ego, for the formation of the super-ego presupposes the longing for an object (the father). When a schizophrenic who has completely lost his moral balance wishes to re-establish his conscience, all he can do is to produce a caricature of morality, made up of pseudo-philosophical, contradictory and meaningless maxims.

* * * * *

After the loss of a love-object there are two factors to be considered. First (a fact which is sufficiently familiar), the subject tries to replace it by an identification with it. Secondly, this identification with a lost love-object is preceded by a preconscious act of the nature of magical thinking, designed to create that object anew. Take for instance the so-called ' imitative magic '. In many countries it is the custom for the peasants in the fields to leap into the air in order to cause the seed to grow high : they are shewing the seed what they want it to do. Such magical practices are discussed at length by Freud in the third chapter of *Totem und Tabu*. In this connection I would refer to the interesting analogy between a certain primitive belief and the fact that, as we have

---

[16] Concrete ideas have never been entirely lost. For the attendant is cathected with libido, even though it be inadequately.

seen, the unconscious makes no distinction between the image of a person and the person himself. When primitive man wants to do his enemy an injury, he inflicts it upon that enemy's image.

In art the creation of an object finds a real expression through the ' omnipotence of thought '. If the imago is repressed, as for example in the super-ego, it can no longer be expressed, i.e. it loses pcs cathexis. In artistic production the imago, now displaced on to a substitute-formation, becomes once more susceptible of expression and breaks through to Pcs (Cs) and thereby into reality. In this sense the whole atmosphere which man creates around him in order to maintain his super-ego, beginning with the renunciation of instinct and with self-punishment and ending with the formulation of a moral code and the institution of worship of a god, is a single magnificent product of art.

The views put forward here are only offered in a tentative way. I believe that they can supply us with fuller understanding of the super-ego, but they must, I know, be tested by other psycho-analysts before any significance can be assigned to them.

SHORTER COMMUNICATION

KIDDING—A FORM OF HUMOUR

Freud considers that the super-ego inherits the position of the parent and actually treats the ego as the parents treated the child in his early years. He has suggested that in humour, the super-ego reacts to the ego as if the latter were a child which it seeks to comfort.[1]

Here, as in many other of Freud's discoveries, one finds corroboration in popular psychology and phraseology. The term ' kidding ' in American slang means to treat like a child (' kid ' being an almost universal vernacular for little child). However, kidding is not without an element of mild cruelty in which the kidder, from a position of advantage or superior knowledge, vents a little momentary pressure against the persons whom he kids and in this characteristic approximates the position of the mastery of the super-ego. Inveterate kidders seem to be projecting an intolerance of their super-egos to their own childishness upon objects less capable of defending themselves. Such ' kidders ' usually take kidding badly, and in the analysis of unusually violent outbursts of resentment of patients to kidding by others it developed that unconsciously they often invited and relished the kidding as an agreeable attestation and as justifiable, but consciously were called upon to defend their super-egos.

The following Americanisms serve to illustrate and support Freud's theory: When a person attempts to jest, to ' put something over ' on another, a common slang retort is ' quit your kidding.' In other words, cease treating me as if I were as guileless and defenceless as a child.

A patient, with an intractable fear of his father, remarked ' I like to say to those who try to kid me—" don't kid me, Big Boy, I'm way ahead of you " '—which translated means, ' don't attempt to treat me as a child, you, who consider yourself superior to me (' Big Boy ' is sarcasm), I am really your master ' (though the patient felt he was not). This idea is carried still further in such a phrase as ' kid me, kid, I am simple '—meaning, don't you, child, dare to treat me as a child. I am not so simple as you would like to have me. If a person is

[1] Freud, S.: " Humour," this JOURNAL, Vol. IX, 1928, p. 3.

treating himself in a delusional or too gentle manner, we have the phrase ' you are kidding yourself ' or ' don't kid yourself '. In other words, ' your super-ego is treating your ego as simply and as kindly as if it were a child '.

C. P. Oberndorf.
(New York.)

BOOK REVIEWS

Misère de l'homme. Par René Laforgue. (Les Editions Denoël et Steele, 1932. Pp. 342. Prix Frs. 15.)

This book is in the form of a diary kept by a neurotic undergoing treatment by psycho-analysis. It has been conceived by Dr. Laforgue (as he tells us in his preface) ' to familiarize with the problems of our nature all those who need to know the unvarnished truth. . . . This book is directed to those who suffer from their lack of self-knowledge. It is directed equally to doctors, parents, teachers and jurists who are concerned for the moral welfare of human society '.

To the majority of those people for whom the book is intended, it may very well prove more acceptable than many a volume designed to inform them what psycho-analysis is about. The clear and simple style makes the book eminently readable, its didactic purpose rarely obtrudes, there is an almost complete absence of technical terms. For those who need it, there is a ' happy ending ', since the treatment is successful, and the patient finds happiness with one whom he can love. There is no doubt that the pill has been well coated, but it should prove none the less efficacious for that.

But, one would imagine, the greatest appeal of the book will be to the neurotic patient, who, so far as he is free to do so, will hardly fail to marvel at the sympathetic insight with which Dr. Laforgue has described and elucidated so many of his difficulties and weaknesses. Nor will he omit to extract some mild amusement from ' My doctor, as always, says nothing ' (p. 174), as well as many other similar realistic passages.

Misère de l'homme is too human, too gentle a book to justify its grandiose title, although here and there the theme indicated by this finds expression, perhaps nowhere more directly than when Dr. Laforgue's gifted neurotic (now far on the road to health) declares : ' When I observe the people in the street—clerks leaving their office, typists, workers . . . all those creatures who represent the great populations of cities—and feel them sustained by their illusions : some with their faith in money and its power to bring everything ; others with their belief in the superiority of the white race or of their country ; others again feeling that they are continually watched over by a Deity whose sole care is to shield them against the dangers of life . . . then I come to envy them for still fancying themselves God's elect : it is almost with terror that I measure the distance between us . . . '

H. Mayor.

*

Elementi di Psicoanalisi. Edoardo Weiss. (Milano, Ulrico Hoepli, 1932, pag. xvi.–242, L. 12.)

This is the second edition, within eighteen months of the first, of a book which should have great success in Italy and conduce greatly to the spirit of knowledge of psycho-analysis in that country. It consists of five sections, cast in lecture form and presented with the skill and thorough knowledge which we should expect from Dr. Weiss. A glossary of twenty-six pages is published at the end in which a paragraph of description is given to each definition. We notice that the Italians, like the English, are unable to use the contraction of narcissism employed in German. Dr. Weiss has not adopted our word ' cathexis ', but uses for it ' carica '. ' Repression ' is translated as ' rimozione ', and ' transference ' by ' traslazione '.

E. J.

*

Al Microscopio Psicanalitico : Pirandello, Ibsen, Shakespeare, Tolstoi, Shaw, Bourget, Gide. Seconda Edizione del volume *Psicanalisi, Scienza dell' Io.* By Silvio Tissi. (Ulrico Hoepli, Milano, 1933, pp. 303.)

The first edition of this book was reviewed in this JOURNAL, Vol. XI, 1930, p. 98, and we are pleased to see that a second edition has already been called for. As well as carrying out the work of revision, Professor Tissi has added two further essays, on Gide and Bourget.

E. J.

*

An Introduction to Analytical Psychotherapy. By T. A Ross. (Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1932. $3.50.)

As is fairly well known, Dr. Ross now for some years has been Medical Director of the Cassel Hospital in England, a hospital founded for and devoted to the study of so-called functional nervous disorders. One of the first-fruits of his contact with adult psychoneurotic cases was his work on *The Common Neuroses.* This work he would still offer as a clinical background for the present work, in which he more specifically deals with certain principles of psychotherapy.

As one reads the present work with the former one by one's elbow, one cannot but be impressed with the idea that Dr. Ross has come a long way along the path of deeper understanding of the psychoneuroses. Although a reluctant and still ambivalent Freudian, he says of the present volume, while disclaiming it as a work on psycho-analysis, ' without Freud it could not have been written '.

This general Freudian mould is evident in the chapter headings : Some Views of the Unconscious ; The Unconscious Transference ; Dreams ; Some Sex Problems ; Symptom Formation ; Fixation and Regression ;

The Study of an Individual Case; Dangers of Analytic Investigation; Technique; Conclusion. There is practically no bibliography and only a short index.

In a very simple way—too simple in many senses—he outlines the general Freudian conception of the Unconscious. To him the conception of the pre- or foreconscious is not very serviceable. One might suspect it was not really comprehended, possibly in a manner roughly analogous to those who do not understand the difference between water at 212° F. and steam at 212° F. as being separated by 256 ' heat units '. ' Heat units ' in the crude metaphor corresponding to the preconscious dynamic work that goes on before steam (conscious) can emerge from water (unconscious). The assumption that Freud's ' unconscious ' contained no ' constructive components ' until Jung put them there (p. 15) is an error of fact. We think the author quite sound on the Adlerian notion. He might have pointed to the Lamarck conceptions as containing all that Adler had to say, except that Adler obtained from Freud new material, from the ' unconscious ', that gave greater value to the Lamarckian ideas. It is satisfactory to note that Ross uses the words repression and suppression in the psycho-analytic sense and does not reverse them as did Rivers. The examples given to illustrate the processes are excellent.

Resistance, transference, regression, fixation as dynamically operating forces are briefly outlined. Transference is first discussed. It is difficult to phrase one's appraisal. If hypercritical and antagonistic one might call it naïve and superficial. This would be unjust, but the fact, which he mentions, that he has not gone through an analytic procedure is quite apparent, else he could have seen deeper into the dynamics of the transference situation than simply the ' liking,' ' in love,' etc. His discussion of homosexual transference is good as far as it goes, but only just goes as far as the ' foreconscious ' aspects. Thus the phrase, apropos of the transference—' whilst it is admitted that it is often sexual, there can be no doubt of its importance in certain non-sexual aspects '—really means nothing.

A somewhat similar remaining on the surface of things is present in the chapter on dreams. The interpretation of dreams is *not* made by the physician. Their interpretation may be verbalized by the analyst, in literary or other form, but in the unconscious of the patient the interpretative work goes on and the healing work becomes ' pegged ' as it were by the apt bringing together of bits of self-revelation that comes through dream associations. This is the analyst's work.

To us the author's discussion of the Œdipus complex is not very satisfactory, and as for Malinowski's Trobrianders, excellent ethnologist as he is, there is no evidence to show how Malinowski thought to find the Œdipus complex—even if he knew it when he did or did not find it. The chief

difficulty here, as elsewhere, is the failure to comprehend deeply the ' unconscious ' features of any ' complex '.

On the whole Dr. Ross here shews himself to be very sympathetic to and enlightened about certain features of analytic psychotherapy. He takes the occasion to correct some of the gross ' boners ' that are pulled about it by the stupid, but there still remains a definite ambivalent attitude that seems necessary for those who still retain certain subjective attitudes towards what should be purely objective methods of research.

S. E. Jelliffe.

*

The Mind at Mischief. By William S. Sadler, M.D. (Funk and Wagnalls Company, New York and London, 1929. Pp. 400. Price $4.00.)

This diffuse book, written by a surgeon, is addressed to both doctors and patients. It is evidently a very well-intentioned production and contains much useful worldly advice.

Regarded, however, as a serious work on the subject of the neuroses, it is based on a level of knowledge that can only be called deplorable. The repeated attempts to present psycho-analytical teaching would be funny if they had no consequences. Speaking of the life and death instincts, the author says : ' Philosophically speaking, the whole Freudian doctrine is wrong, in my opinion, in that it contemplates life as evil, while the goal of death is all that is ideally good ' (p. 103). In reference to patients with melancholia, who think they have committed the unpardonable sin we learn that ' Freud thinks this sort of melancholia is a grown-up form of Narcissism. We first worship ourselves, and later on, when we are cured of that, we get sick and indulge in a sort of glorified pity for ourselves ' (p. 139). Another simplification is that ' Freud thinks obsessions come on as the result of imperfect repression of some wish, and when the obsession is marked or involves a group of muscles he is inclined to regard it as " conversion hysteria " ' (p. 142). It is not rare for casual readers of psychiatry to get muddled over the concepts of projection and introjection, but the following passage goes beyond the average in this respect : ' Likewise the more strictly Freudian definition of *projection* has to do with the patient's disowning something which has originated in his mind and attributing it to some external source. A typical illustration, often met with, is the tendency of certain hysterical women who accuse innocent men of misconduct. The counterpart of projection is called *introjection*, and is the phenomenon we see in paranoia, where a patient ascribes personal meaning to every little thing that happens in his environment ' (p. 246).

Dr. Sadler does not altogether condemn Freud : ' Before the days of Freud, psychotherapists depended almost exclusively on hypnotism to locate the offending complex. Freud made one advance, at least, in that he got away from hypnotism, though in my opinion he depended too much

upon dreams ' (p. 378). His judgement of the Œdipus complex is : As I say, I think these ideas are greatly overworked, but in a mild manner this is true in all families ' (p. 245).

Perhaps the publisher is not far out in the claim he makes for the book. ' Although the author of many books on mental hygiene, Dr. Sadler's *The Mind at Mischief* is his crowning work—an original contribution to psychological science, yet written so that the ordinary reader can get full thrill of its revelations.'

E. J.

*

The Maniac. By ? (Watts & Co., Second Edition, 1932. Pp. 259. Price *7s. 6d.* net.)

This is a true and well justified ' Story with a Moral '. The first edition was published in 1909 shortly after the authoress (a journalist, then aged thirty-five) had recovered from an acute mental illness lasting from September 29 to November 6, 1908 ; and the book is an extraordinarily clear and detailed description of the bewildering jumble of confused and terrorizing thoughts, phantasies, hallucinations and delusions, which occurred during the malady. She tells us that to write the book required but the smallest effort of memory because the experiences were indelibly branded on her mind. On the other hand, there were many incidents she does not remember ; and this, in her curious attempt at psychopathology, she ascribes to the mind being separated from the body, the ego severed from the brain and so forth.

It will be gathered from the above that this was not a case of mania, but one of " acute confusion " or " the exhaustion psychosis."

The reason for the writer's anonymity is obvious, but the title of the volume is unfortunate, not merely because the diagnosis is wrong, but also because the word ' maniac ' has a sinister connotation in the public mind. The publisher has issued the book in a scare dust-cover like that of a detective novel, where the aim of the publication is a serious one.

For five and a half weeks this poor lady lived the most horrifying and torturing nightmare it is possible to conceive and she appears to have the notion that all or most mental patients go through similar experiences. While most of them suffer extreme misery, unbearable at times, we are glad to be able to assure her that they do not all suffer as much as she did. Some indeed are hilariously happy, but—to all without exception—to be misunderstood intensifies their unhappiness very greatly.

As we should expect, sexual thoughts, both manifest and symbolized, played an important rôle. Early in the illness she fell in love with the artist of a picture in her room. She had never even seen him, but he took a prominent part right through the attack. She was engaged to him, became his wife and was identified with him—and others. She was seduced, not

by the artist, but by a fiend, she was pregnant with a fiend baby, and so on. From a psycho-analytical point of view it would be interesting to know the details of that picture.

The book will be welcomed by psycho-analysts especially, because it presents the patient's point of view, which is exactly what we spend our time in trying to obtain, whereas most other doctors actively refuse to make the attempt. Even ' the most highly trained mental doctors and nurses are, evidently, utterly at sea with regard to a lunatic's consciousness '. ' That this is so will be apparent to anyone who reads this narrative.' It is therefore for such doctors and nurses that the book is primarily intended in the hope that ' some of them may learn something from this human document '.

W. H. B. Stoddart.

*

Psychopathology of Forced Movements in Oculogyric Crises. By Smith Ely Jelliffe, M.D. (Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co., New York and Washington, 1932. Pp. 219. Price $4.00.)

Some years ago a physician was heard to remark, ' If only neurologists cared to invoke encephalitis lethargica to explain the psycho-neuroses, how tiresome they could be to modern psychologists ! ' Those were the days when shell-shock was being attributed to minute cerebral hæmorrhages. Times have changed, and now we have Dr. Jelliffe, of New York, boldly attempting by psycho-analytic technique to elucidate the mysterious phenomena following encephalitis lethargica. Formerly it would have required some courage to undertake the task. Cerebral localisation and irritating lesions were held sufficient to explain the manifestations, as long as the latter were physical. But when it was noticed that not only was thought movement slowed, but that morbid anxiety also was present during the attacks, involving a ' hypertonia of the entire bodily musculature, striped as well as unstriped ', the time clearly had come for the physician to take a more comprehensive view of human activity, and see the organism striving for survival and mental equilibrium even when its higher cerebral centres were to a greater or less extent disabled. The effect of this physical decontrol seems to be worthy of close psycho-analytic study, not only because of the clearing up of dark places in psycho-pathology, but also and more especially because there is some evidence of therapeutic benefits to follow.

Whether psychical determination can be claimed for all the ocular movements in the crises which are the subject of this monograph needs much more investigation, as does also the actual emotional significance of any given type of movement. Detailed observation of the crises rules out the easy explanation of the eye spasms as being due to the rolling up of the globes in a simple desire for sleep, just as the onset of concomitant squint

in early childhood can no longer be intelligently attributed to a simple desire for a sharp focus. Dr. Jelliffe, by correlating the ocular movements with other physical reactions and the accompanying affective states, finds reason for assuming that they serve some purpose in relieving tension following upon instinctual demands no longer under the control of the cortical centres.

Why the individual is only at times thus functionally decerebrate is far from clear, nor are the personal observations of the author sufficiently extensive to permit dogmatism on the question of why the emotional crises are expressed in terms of ocular movements. Ordinary ophthalmic experience offers little beyond tics and rare hysterical neuro-muscular lesions to be compared even distantly with the spasms of these crises, but other ocular symptoms as an expression of unconscious conflict are so common that doubtless more will be heard of the psycho-analytical significance of the synergisms.

' In this communication full discussion is impossible to outline how far the encephalitic disease process has involved the machine so far as the Ego-as conscious perceptive system—reality tester—is involved, nor how far the same process has attacked the anatomical structures utilised in the Super-Ego synthesis '. If we may assume that such a discussion is omitted not from lack of material but from want of space, we hope that a second and larger edition will be speedily forthcoming.

W. S. Inman.

*

The Physical Mechanism of the Human Mind. By A. C. Douglas, M.B., Ch.B. (E. & S. Livingstone, Edinburgh, 1932. Pp. xiv and 251. Price 15*s*.)

' By taking full advantage of the latest advances in physiological knowledge the gaps left by Associationism may be filled, the criticism and requirements of Gestaltism may be met, and a complete scientific theory of mind may be presented upon the materialist basis which Behaviourism rightly demands '. Such, and no less, is the claim made by the author, a surgeon, for his work, and throughout the book he appears confident that he has achieved a final interpretation of all mental phenomena in physiological terms.

The early chapters include selections from orthodox physiology of the nervous system, well written and illustrated, but not brought into relation with his main thesis. Among these, Lapicque's theory of isochronism is given prominence, though it was never widely believed and is now disproved. This theory, which claimed that motor nerves and the muscles they innervate have the same time-relations or ' chronaxies ', is extrapolated by the author to apply to nerve circuits in the central nervous system. The selective relation between the currents in his nerve circuits

is illustrated by the analogy of wave-lengths and a radio receiver. Later, the circuit wave-length, now labelled chronaxy, masquerades as physiological knowledge. The magic word chronaxy disguises a variety of unfamiliar meanings (e.g. p. 175), but solves the riddle of consciousness.

The other physiological legend which contributes to the ' materialist basis of the mind ' is that ' the nerve paths most frequently stimulated acquire stability and permanence ', such as to facilitate the passage of subsequent impulses. It is, of course, quite unsubstantiated by experiment.

The psychology in the later chapters presents a similar curious medley of orthodox school psychology and adventures in recent developments, but, as already indicated, amateur experiment with the ' latest advances ' is apt to be a trifle wild. The only reference to psycho-analysis alludes to the work of a Sigismund Freud who apparently wants ' to enthrone sex, even in children . . . , as *the* ultimate motive, the *fons et origo* of all reaction ', and who introduces ' mythical excrescences ' as, for example, the Ego and the Id, which form ' a picturesque embellishment of the history of psychology, the scientific value of which, however, is negligible.' The author, by contrast, claims to give a simple and rational explanation of repression, sublimation, and so on, as the interplay of cortical stimulations and inhibitions, but the actual application of his ' chronactic relations ' between ' cerebral loop-lines ' to mental processes would seem to be as intricate a form of fiction as the most abstruse detective story.

The correlation between the physiological and the psychological aspects of behaviour will no doubt proceed slowly as a consequence of innumerable and laborious researches from both points of view. The book under consideration is clear evidence that at present the subject cannot be dealt with adequately in a single comprehensive treatment even by so accomplished an author. It is magnificent, but it is not science.

F. R. Winton.

*

Mind and Money—A Psychologist Looks at the Crisis. By John T. MacCurdy. (Faber and Faber, 1932. Pp. 319. Price 10*s.* 6*d.*)

The subject of this book is of such fundamental importance that, whether or not one agrees with Dr. MacCurdy's method or his conclusions, one must admire the hardihood with which he has approached his subject.

Before commenting on the specific content of the volume, certain general characteristics of Dr. MacCurdy's methods of logical reasoning are worth notice. A salient peculiarity which sometimes makes it difficult to follow the exposition is a tendency to omit steps in the process of a logical argument. Again and again one comes to a ' therefore ' which seems in no way justified by the statements which had preceded it. Allied to this, in the sense it gives the reader of the essential privacy of Dr. MacCurdy's thought, is a sort of special pleading—a willingness to ignore any

refractory aspects of an argument, so that one is left with the impression that the author has followed the more tenuous steps of his thesis balanced on a thin knife edge, surrounded by a legion of unpleasant facts which he must ignore.

Dr. MacCurdy accepts the classical definition of economic man as he who buys in the cheapest, and sells in the dearest, market. Men in their economic aspect will be motivated only by the desire for gain unless other desires or loyalties ' cut across ' the economic motive. These conflicting emotions are entirely social, and only to be understood in terms of group psychology. His exposition of the latter may be briefly summarized : the true group, as distinguished from the pathological crowd, and the group temporarily organized for a limited purpose, is characterized by organization under leaders ; its members are motivated by loyalty to an unconscious group ideal, which, according to the author, becomes more unconscious as the group becomes more highly evolved. National groups are characterized by unworldly (*sic*) group ideals, so that national economics deviate from the basic economic laws in so far as the members of the nation are loyal to their national ideals. The author then proceeds to examine the ideals of several nations, and to formulate the affect of these ideals on national economics, during the present crisis.

Very briefly summarized, this is the burden of the book. It contains a great deal of interesting observation which has been thoroughly correlated from the author's point of view. In criticizing it, it is essential to examine Dr. MacCurdy's fundamental premises, rather than to deal at length with his exposition. Has he approached his subject from the point of view which will give the most fruitful and important results ? Or are his premises essentially sterile ? To the psycho-analyst the answer to these questions seems obvious. The author has dealt with the entire subject from a static, rather than from a dynamic point of view. He has described phenomena, without making any real attempt to explain their origin. He has made no attempt to deal with the importance of money in terms of the unconscious. One might mention in passing that the only reference to the symbolism of money comments on the fact that men tend to desire money, rather than the things it can buy—thus using it as a ' symbol ' for wealth. The author's attitude towards psychology is characterized by a tendency to under-rate the active influence of unconscious motives, and to minimize their importance. This is well illustrated by the following : ' Psychology and economics are alike in that their major data are facts of common knowledge . . . in there being for each a relatively insignificant mass of important esoteric knowledge '. Again : ' Whether the unconscious root of exalted patriotism is the same as the unconscious root of religion is a question the psychologist cannot answer : he regards it as either insoluble or as a problem for the philosopher. He is, moreover,

indifferent *qua* psychologist, as to the unity or duality of the unconscious Anlage '.

Surely the only valuable way to approach this subject is from the point of view of the individual, rather than from that of the group. What does the motive of gain mean to individuals ? How is it affected by different sorts of external group organization ? When is it stable and adjusted ? What causes it to regress, dragging with it the organization of groups, until whole nations are governed by neurotic crowd psychology ? These are some of the questions still to be answered. It is to be hoped that the readers of this book will not close it under the impression that psychology has said its last word concerning the relationship of mind to money.

Elizabeth Rosenberg.

✱

The Evolution of Sex and Intersexual Conditions. By Dr. Gregorio Marañón. Translated from the Spanish by Warre B. Wells. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1932. Pp. 344. Price 15*s*.)

The thesis which Dr. Gregorio Marañón attempts to prove is stated on the first page, where he says that ' masculine and feminine are not two diametrically opposed entities but successive degrees in the development of a single function—sex : ' and again later he restates what he calls ' the fundamental notion, that woman is an organism, arrested at puberty, with collateral maternal differentiation, but with general characteristics of frankly infantile accent ' : and again : ' The woman, in sexual evolution, is in a condition midway between adolescence and virility ' : and again ' the female is an organism midway between the infantile and the virile organism, the latter is the terminal phase of the former '. He produces a chart to illustrate what he believes to be the evolution of sex, showing how in all human beings it evolves from infancy *via* a feminoid phase to a terminal phase of masculinity which is thus ' equivalent to a differentiated and almost perfect form '. In the male the feminine phase, occurring during the crisis of puberty, is brief : in the female the feminine phase lasts till the climacteric, and only after passing this crisis does she continue her evolution along the path of virility, which even then she cannot hope to attain completely, shewing only an approximation to it in the matter of an increased pilosity and an improved aptitude for practical affairs.

The height of virility, we are told, is achieved only when the head is bald and the pilosity of the lower parts of the face and the body extensive. There is no portrait of the author attached to this volume.

From this evolutionary view of sex it follows that sex itself is neither feminine nor masculine, since in the course of its development it passes through the former phase on the way to the latter.

Dr. Marañón uses this theory of the fundamental bisexuality of all

human beings to explain inversion, the topic with which the larger part of his book deals. He enumerates in great detail the physical characteristics which distinguish male and female and brings evidence from enormous numbers of physical examinations to shew how frequently characteristics of both sexes are found coexisting in a single individual, thus proving the individual to have a certain amount of organic bisexuality. Some such organic basis he regards as an essential condition of homosexuality, but he allows considerable weight also to psychological conditioning factors.

All this evidence of the co-existence of masculine and feminine physical characteristics in the same individual, however, though interesting in itself, does not seem really to do much to prove Dr. Marañón's main thesis that femininity is a stage of evolution intermediate between infancy and masculinity. It would seem equally compatible with the view that femininity and masculinity are both adult states, but that many human beings are constitutionally more or less bisexual, shewing simultaneously adult sexual characteristics belonging to both sexes. If this interpretation of the material presented by Dr. Marañón is equally possible, his book, though containing many interesting facts, must be admitted to have failed in its main intention.

From the more strictly analytical point of view it is open to further criticism in that it omits all mention of the unconscious factors which underlie homosexuality, and shews no appreciation of the enormous part played in civilization by sublimated homosexual instincts : also it deviates from the objectivity of the scientific point of view to concern itself with moral and ethical judgments.

Dr. Marañón deplores ' the vestiges of the opposite sex ', which he finds to be so common in human beings, describing them as ' like a thorn stuck in our instinctive life which may fester '. He describes those who desire children as ' normal and elevated ', and refers to maternity as a ' sacred end ', so much so that it cannot be classed as a part of sexuality at all, since ' its very nobility detaches it, as it were, from the sexual instinct and gives it a higher psychic rank '.

Thus it would appear that Dr. Marañón has not been able to free himself from the romantic attitude in which Woman, denied the attributes of adult humanity, is simultaneously despised and adored as a sort of cross between baby and angel.

Karin Stephen.

CLINICAL PRIZE ESSAY

The Institute has received a sum of money for the establishment of a prize for a clinical essay. The following regulations have been drawn up for the administration of this fund and the requirements of the essay.

Schedule of Regulations

A. Administration of the Fund

1. *Name and Purposes.*—The Fund shall be called ' The Clinical Essay Fund ', and shall be devoted to the furtherance of scientific knowledge of mental pathology.

2. *Management.*—As soon as the sum of money designated ' Clinical Essay Fund ' shall have been transferred to the Institute of Psycho-Analysis (hereinafter called ' the Institute ') the Board of the Institute shall appoint as Trustees to administer the Fund, the President, the Hon. Business Secretary and the Hon. Treasurer of the Institute for the time being, and at its discretion others.

3. *Application of Income.*—The Institute shall apply the income arising from the said Fund for the purpose (*inter alia*) of providing an annual money prize value not exceeding £20 for an essay on the clinical record of a case investigated by psycho-analytical methods.

4. *Notice and Advertisement.*—The Trustees are not obliged to advertise the Essay Prize periodically in any public place. On receipt of the money designated ' Clinical Essay Fund ' the Board agrees to print in the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis ' these regulations in full. Any changes in these regulations shall be published in the issue of the Journal immediately following such changes. If any person applies to the Hon. Secretary or any other officer of the Institute for copies of these regulations it shall be sufficient that he is referred to the place in the Journal where they are given.

5. *Appointment of Judges.*—The judges of the essays submitted for competition shall be appointed by the Board of the Institute for the time being or in the event of transfer of the Trust by corresponding officers of the succeeding organization. Such judges shall be three in number, of whom one must have attained distinction in a field of science other than psycho-analysis. Each appointment shall be for one year. Any person re-elected for two further years after the first year shall be ineligible for re-election until the expiration of a further period of three years. The appointment of the judges in any year shall be recorded in the minute books of the Board of the Institute three months before the date of the award in that year.

6. *Storage of Prize Essays.*—Two copies of the prize essays shall be bound at the expense of the fund and placed in the library of the Institute.

Should the Library at any time be thrown open for public use the series of prize essays shall be withdrawn from the open shelves and put into a category for special readers.

(B) The Essay

7. *Requirements in the Essay.*—The essay shall consist of a clinical record of a case investigated by psycho-analytical methods. It shall clearly illustrate events and changes in the mental life of the patient and their relation to external environment. In awarding the prize the judges will pay attention to acuity of observation and the clearness with which the facts are stated. If the writer wishes to draw theoretical conclusions he must bear in mind the necessity of making the evidence for such conclusions carry conviction. It is recommended the length of the essay should not exceed 20,000 words.

8. *Date of Sending in Essays, Language, Format, etc.*—Essays must be submitted in the English language on or before March 31 in any year. They must be in typescript on 4to paper with ample left-hand margin. They must be in triplicate and must be sent to the Hon. Secretary of the Institute.

All copies of essays submitted become *ipso facto* the property of the Institute (or its successor) while it has the appointment of the Trustees.

9. *No Award.*—If no essay is submitted of merit worthy of a prize in any year no award shall be made for that year.

10. *Joint Award.*—In the event of the judges regarding the essays of two or more competitors of equal merit they may divide the prize money available for distribution as aforesaid into equal parts and award it to such competitors jointly.

11. *Eligibility.*—Any person of either sex shall be eligible for the competition who is not a member or a past member of the Board of the Institute.

12. *Tenure.*—The prize shall be given to the writer of the best essay in the opinion of the judges submitted in any year, but the prize may be awarded to the same person twice provided that he submits a second essay of sufficient merit in a later competition, provided always that the prize shall not be awarded more than twice to the same person.

13. *Title.*—The competitor to whom the prize is awarded in any year may be called the Clinical Prizeman for that year.

14. *Copyright.*—The copyright of any essay to which a prize is awarded shall become the property of the Institute. Should the author wish to quote it in whole or in part the Institute shall not unreasonably withhold its consent. The Institute shall not publish such essay in whole or in part in English or in translation in England or abroad without the author's written consent given during his lifetime. Other persons who may wish to quote extracts from any prize essay shall obtain the written consent of the Institute or its successor and of the author given during his lifetime.

BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

EDITED BY

ANNA FREUD, GENERAL SECRETARY

I. Reports of Proceedings of Societies

BRITISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Second Quarter, 1932

Scientific Meetings

April 13, 1932. Mrs. Joan Riviere: ' Remarks on a case of Morbid Jealousy used as a Defence '. Transitory accessions of persecutory jealousy were found on analysis to be not merely a projection of infidelity in the patient herself (often they were not), but invariably to be projections of the underlying ucs significance of infidelity in oral-erotic-sadistic terms, viz., situations of gratification by despoiling parent-figures (husband, analyst, etc.) of their possessions, organs and love-objects, thus ravaging and triumphing over them. Jealous scenes occurred after patient (in phantasy or reality) had herself secured some triumph or acquisition at another's expense, anxiety and anticipation of talion retribution being thus aroused. This dread produced an intense avoidance of causing a total and lasting loss, or achieving a consummation of possession, i.e. through *biting off* (the primary ontogenetic idea of ' death ', through disappearance of the object by swallowing). To avert this anxiety, fixation (or regression) to a *sucking* mode of oral possession ensued, a perpetual, protracted absorption, a process *not to be* completed. All jealousy, even the so-called normal, in part consists of an ucs judgement that the loss is a retribution for acts (and phantasies) of oral aggression by the betrayed himself.

May 4, 1932. Mrs. Klein: ' Homosexuality in the Male '. (Excerpts from a chapter of her forthcoming book *The Psycho-analysis of Children*.)

May 26, 1932. (1) Dr. Brierley: An abstract of Mrs. Klein's paper, ' Homosexuality in the Male '. (2) Mrs. Isaacs: A series of dreams illustrating the paper. (3) The adjourned discussion of Mrs. Klein's paper was then concluded.

June 1, 1932. Miss Searl: ' Play, Reality and Aggression '. Institution of reality principle only a result of deprivation. Completely satisfied infant needs no external world. Very unsatisfied and impatient infant seeks only to devour what he only temporarily allows to exist in his search for satisfaction. Processes of introjection and projection lead to no stable relation with a coherent reality. Basis of this latter is found in earliest

play-situations : e.g. in attitude of the happily desirous and not too impatient infant to the approaching, but still not attained, maternal breast. Play marked, not by absence of aggression, but by absence of aggressive hate or rage. Repressed rage, if present in large quantity, can entirely eliminate any possibility of what is usually called play. Study of a case of very severe obsession : a marked instance of compulsive play in the service of avoiding anxiety rather than of obtaining pleasure. Possibilities of maintaining a relation with some limited form of reality depended upon the retention of this form of ' play ' until some development of ' pleasure-play ' provided a basis for a wider and more stable object-relation.

June 29, 1932. Dr. Eder : ' The Phylactery and other Jewish Ritual Ornaments '. Certain ornaments used by the Jews in their daily life are briefly considered from various standpoints. The ornaments are :— (1) Phylacteries (Teffillin). (2) Garments with fringes and tassels ; (*a*) small shawl worn all day (tsitsith) ; (*b*) large praying mantle (talith). (3) Door post sign (mezuzah). Traditionally they are used in obedience to God's commandments ; historically they are regarded as amulets and can be compared with similar ritual usages among other peoples. Jewellery has a similar origin ; these amulets have, it has been shewn, a phallic significance ; psycho-analytic investigation (Abraham, Fromm-Reichmann, Reik, Langer) has shewn their totemic nature. Liturgical and historical evidence is reviewed and clinical data adduced supporting the psycho-analytic findings.

Edward Glover.
Hon. Scientific Secretary.

Business Meetings. Second and Third Quarters, 1932

May 4, 1932. Dr. Jones made a statement on the financial state of the *Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag* and an appeal from Professor Freud was communicated to the meeting. After discussion it was decided to appoint a sub-committee, consisting of Dr. Jones, Dr. Glover, Dr. Payne, Dr. Rickman and Mr. Strachey, to consider the question further.

June 1, 1932. Dr. Jones presented a report from this committee and read a communication from Dr. Eitingon. Dr. Jones then moved from the Chair ' That this Society cordially supports Professor Freud's appeal that responsibility for the *Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag* be transferred from private hands to those of the International Psycho-Analytical Association, the administration presumably to be carried on by an Executive Committee appointed by the Congress, and in support of this aim recommends its members to undertake to subscribe a sum of money, if possible not less than fifteen shillings per member per month for twenty months '. The resolution was carried unanimously.

July 6, 1932. *Annual Meeting.*

The reports of the Secretaries, Treasurer and Librarian were submitted to the members.

The following officers were elected for the ensuing year :

President, Dr. Ernest Jones.

Scientific Secretary, Dr. Edward Glover.

Business Secretary, Dr. Sylvia Payne.

Treasurer, Dr. Douglas Bryan.

Members of Council, Dr. Rickman, Dr. Stoddart, Dr. Adrian Stephen.

Training Committee, Dr. Glover, Dr. Jones, Mrs. Klein, Dr. Payne, Dr. Rickman and Miss Sharpe.

Librarian, Miss Low.

Members of Library Sub-committee, Dr. Brierley, Miss Chadwick, Mr. Strachey.

Following Dr. Stoddart's retirement from the Library Committee a vote of thanks for his past services was recorded by the meeting. Dr. Stoddart and Miss Chadwick were appointed to administer the ' James Glover Memorial Fund '. Dr. Stoddart made a statement concerning the James Glover Memorial Library.

Election of Member : Miss Sheehan-Dare.

Election of Associate Member : Dr. Denis Carroll.

The question of public non-technical lectures on psycho-analysis was discussed, and the Board of the Institute of Psycho-Analysis was asked to take action in this direction.

Changes of Address :

Professor Cyril Burt, 4 Eton Road, N.W.3.

Dr. Denis Carroll, 22 Queen Anne Street, W.1.

Miss Barbara Low, 3 Bulstrode Street, W.1.

Dr. Bernard Hart, Harcourt House, Cavendish Square, W.1.

Dr. Rees Thomas, 26 Queens Gardens, W.2.

Dr. E. R. Winton, 1 Drosier Road, Cambridge.

S. M. Payne,
Hon. Business Secretary.

DUTCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

First and Second Quarters, 1932

January 16, 1932. (The Hague.) *Annual Meeting.*

(*a*) *Re-election of Council :* J. H. W. van Ophuijsen, *President ;* A. Endtz, *Secretary ;* Dr. F. P. Muller, *Treasurer ;* Professor Dr. K. H. Bouman, *Librarian.*

(*b*) M. Katan : ' A Case of Senile Melancholia '.

March 5, 1932. (Amsterdam.) Dr. J. H. van der Hoop : ' The Significance of Jung's Character-types '.

April 30, 1932. (The Hague.) Discussion of a letter from the Nederlandsche Vereeniging voor Psychiatrie en Neurologie on the subject of co-operation between the two societies. It was agreed that a member of the Council of the Nederlandsche Vereeniging should regularly be present at the meetings of the Dutch Psycho-Analytical Society. A draft of new statutes was discussed. By ten votes to three it was decided that laymen should not be admitted to full membership of the society. Preliminary arrangements were made for a joint meeting with the Nederlandsche Vereeniging voor Psychiatrie en Neurologie.

June 11, 1932. (Amsterdam.) All members of the Nederlandsche Vereeniging voor Psychiatrie en Neurologie were invited to this meeting. About sixty members and guests were present. After an opening speech by the President and some introductory remarks by Professor Dr. K. H. Bouman, the following papers were read :

(*a*) Dr. F. P. Muller : ' The System of Neuroses and Psychoses from the standpoint of Psycho-Analysis '.

(*b*) Dr. H. C. Jelgersma : ' Notes on the Analytic Method of Investigation in Psychoses '.

(*c*) M. Katan : ' Freud's Conception of the Super-ego '.

(*d*) A. Endtz : ' The Sense of Guilt and the Need for Punishment '.

(*e*) J. H. W. van Ophuijsen : ' Psycho-Analysis as a Therapeutic Method '.

A. Endtz,
Secretary.

FRENCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Second Quarter, 1932

April 19, 1932. *Business Meeting.*

May 23, 1932. (*a*) Mme. Socolnicka : ' A Case of Rapid Cure '. Cure, after seventeen analytic sessions, of a young woman suffering from various symptoms.

(*b*) Dr. Nacht : ' Two Cases of Psycho-Analytic Treatment followed by Rapid Cure '. (i.) A young girl suffering from obsessional neurosis ; (ii.) a young man suffering from genital impotence. Both cured after from six to eight weeks of treatment.

June 21, 1932. (*a*) *Business Meeting.*

Election of Associate Member : Dr. P. Male, médecin-assistant de l'Hôpital Henri Rousselle. The President, Dr. Borel, was requested to draw up a memorandum to the proper authorities asking permission for psycho-analysts to be admitted to certain prisons in order to study particular accused or convicted persons.

(*b*) Dr. Loewenstein : ' A Case of Pathological Jealousy '.

S. Nacht,
Secretary.

GERMAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Second Quarter, 1932

April 12, 1932. Dr. Wulff: ' An Interesting Oral Symptom Complex '.

April 19, 1932. Dr. Sachs: ' The Retardation of the Age of Machinery '.

April 30, 1932. Dr. Lampl de Groot: ' A Contribution to the problems of Libidinal Tendencies whose aim is both active and passive '. Theory of bisexuality. The final development into masculinity (activity) or femininity (passivity) does not occur till puberty, though the way is prepared for it in early childhood. For active love it is necessary that the narcissistic libido-reservoir should reach a certain level so that libido may be transferred to the object. When his narcissism is damaged, a person must cause himself to be loved passively, in order that it may be restored. Of the early hurts sustained by the individual's narcissism the most important is the phallic, i.e. in boys, a pathologically acute dread of castration, in girls, the discovery of their lack of a penis. These wounding experiences result in the abandonment of activity in favour of passivity. The latter becomes fixated by a turning inwards of the instinct of aggression (masochism). In boys this process leads to mal-development, in girls to normal femininity.

If Freud's theory of instinct be applied to the problem of which portions of the libido are active and which passive in their aim, the following conclusions are arrived at. It appears to be the task of the narcissistic libido to bind the death-instinct which operates within the organism. Relations to objects are inaugurated by the instinct of aggression (the death-instinct turned outwards), which is accompanied by libido (the infant's behaviour in relation to the mother's breast). With the secondary turning inwards of the instinct of aggression libido is also withdrawn into the ego. Probably the libidinal trends whose aim is active are those which accompany the instinct of aggression when directed outwards, while that part of the libido whose aim is passive binds the aggressive instinct when directed inwards.

May 10, 1932. Short communications:

(1) Dr. Bernfeld: ' Thomasius, a precursor of analysis in the seventeenth century '.

(2) Dr. Simmel: ' *Coitus interruptus* and its counterpart, *coitus prolongatus* '. (A contribution to the psychopathogenesis of coitus with contraception.) The analysis of neurotics who at intervals make a practice of *coitus interruptus* suggests that this mode of sexual intercourse is very often ultimately determined by unconscious factors. The reasons consciously alleged for the intentional breaking-off of the sexual act (e.g. the prevention of pregnancy) are evidently rationalizations and do not adequately explain the attitude of the man, who entirely ignores his

partner's real sexual enjoyment. We may suppose that *coitus interruptus* often represents the gratification of an infantile sexual demand belonging to the Œdipal or pre-Œdipal period. Often it is a true perversion. In this sexual practice, as in the other perversions, the intense pleasure in it derives from the neutralization of the danger of castration : by the interruption of the act the penis is saved again and again.

A contrary practice, which may be termed '*coitus prolongatus*', is not infrequently to be observed in men with an obsessional neurosis. Here, in contrast to *coitus interruptus*, the man has an exaggerated idea of his duty to gratify the woman by her orgasm. He has a tendency to resort to deliberately thought-out manipulations in order to prolong erection as much as possible during the act. If he succeeds, the friction is more or less devoid of pleasure and, accordingly, ejaculation occurs unaccompanied by psychic orgasm. This neurotic mechanism in sexual practice represents a defence against the perversion of *coitus interruptus*.

Between these two modes of sexual procedure, regarded as symptomatic behaviour, we have *ejaculatio præcox*, a true neurotic (conversion) symptom, representing a compromise between the needs for gratification and for punishment. *Coitus interruptus* is, as it were, an artificial *ejaculatio præcox*, whereas *coitus prolongatus* represents the avoidance of *ejaculatio præcox*. The harmful effects, in the shape of actual neurosis, which result from *coitus prolongatus* are probably similar to those of *coitus interruptus*. In both cases disturbances occur in the sexual mechanism by reason of the incompatibility between the psychic and somatic discharge of excitation.

May 28, 1932. *Business Meeting.*

The Society considered Professor Freud's circular letter of Easter 1932, on the subject of the difficulties of the *I. P. Verlag*, and resolved to guarantee 600 marks monthly for two years, every member being bound to contribute at least three dollars a month for that period. Contributions to be paid to Dr. Lampl ; a committee, consisting of Dr. Eitingon and Dr. Lampl, to adjust matters in the case of members who are less well off. Payments to the Training Loan Fund to cease until further notice.

May 31, 1932. Dr. Landmark : '*Erotogenicity and Object-libido*'. Preliminary consideration of the nature and mode of operation of the erotogenic zones on an anatomical and physiological basis. Erotogenicity is connected with the centripetal activity of the receptors. Object-love is differentiated from other sexual object-relations by the selfless, 'centrifugal' tendency to confer happiness. Through the subject's 'empathy' with the object (which we regard as an identification) harmony with the pleasure-principle is maintained. This identification expresses the subject's endeavour to erect a vaster ego, which presupposes that the limits of his ego have been recognized. Along these lines we may search for a psychologically comprehensible basis for object-love.

June 7, 1932. Dr. Kluge (guest of the Society) : ' Observations on Sublimation through Religion '. In the field of the psychology of religion the psycho-analytic method has already important discoveries to record : it has demonstrated that in the formation of religious systems the Œdipus complex is universally operative. At the same time, we must bear in mind our own principle of over-determination, i.e. we must recognize that in the final evaluation of the religious element other methods of investigation must be allowed their say. In dealing with observations of the real world science makes exclusive use of the critical intellect : the subject, with his faculty of discursive reasoning and detachment from the experience under consideration, surveys an objective external world from which he is distinct. To this real ego religion is and must be an illusion. To a different ego-structure, on the other hand, there would (we may suppose) correspond another world and another reality (' perspectivism '). In the course of his evolution man passes from one ego-structure to another, but none of these entirely vanishes : in the deepest psychic strata they persist. According to Freud, the ' oceanic feeling ' belongs to the earliest stratum of all. In this stratum subject and object are not as yet fully differentiated, so that ' the ego-feeling we are aware of now is only a shrunken vestige of a far more extensive feeling—a feeling which expressed an inseparable connection of the ego with the external world '. This ' participation ', as opposed to the subject-object relation, may be assumed to have its basis in the post-embryonic relation between mother and child. Having demonstrated the relations existing between the Œdipus complex and the longing for the father in religion, psycho-analytic research must proceed to investigate the pre-Œdipal stratum of early infantile experience, with its longing for the mother in religion.

June 21, 1932. *Business meeting.*

(1) *Election of Associate Members :* Dr. Gustav Hans Graber and Dr. Johannes Landmark.

(2) Discussion : Political points of view in psycho-analytical debate.

June 28, 1932. Dr. Reich : ' Problems of Group-Psychology in the Economic Crisis '. The National-Socialist movement illustrates the fact that the familial environment of the lower middle classes causes their radical tendencies to take the direction of political reaction rather than that of revolution. National Socialism imparts to the rebellion of the middle classes a reactionary character, to which their former social and familial position has peculiarly disposed them. Analysis of the effective content of the racial theory shews that ' nordic ' is equated with ' pure ', i.e. asexual, whereas ' alien ' signifies something sensual, base and animal

Dr. Felix Boehm,
Secretary.

HUNGARIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Second Quarter, 1932

April 1, 1932. *General Meeting.* The new statutes approved by the Council were laid before the members. Election of the Council. Dr. I. Hollós was elected Vice-President.

April 8, 1932. Dr. M. J. Eisler: 'Goethe's Attempt to Save a Soul'.

April 22, 1932. Frau Dr. L. K. Rotter: 'A Phase of Libidinal Development in Women'.

May 6, 1932. Frau A. Bálint: A review of the psycho-analytical writings of Frau Dr. Horney.

May 20, 1932. Frau Dr. F. K. Hann: 'Facts Relating to the Theory of Sexual Development in Women'.

June 10, 1932. Dr. I. Hollós: 'The Psychopathology of Slight Telepathic Manifestations'.

June 24, 1932. Dr. M. Bálint: 'Character-analysis and Beginning Afresh'.

Change of address: Dr. Zs. Pfeifer, Budapest I., Attila u. 69.

Dr. Imre Hermann,
Secretary.

THE NEW YORK PSYCHO-ANALYTIC SOCIETY

Second Quarter, 1932

April 26, 1932. Dr. F. Alexander (by invitation): 'On Instinctual and Structural Conflicts'. On the basis of case-material, the speaker demonstrated the interdependence of the instinctual and structural points of view in the interpretation of neurotic conflicts.

No meeting was held in May, because the American Psychoanalytic Association met conjointly with the American Psychiatric Association in Philadelphia during the last week of the month. Members of the New York Society who read papers before these bodies were: Brill, Glueck, French, Zilboorg, Lorand, Kubie, Coriat, McCord and Lewin. No meeting was held in June.

Dr. M. Ralph Kaufman, Clinical Director of the McLean Hospital, Waverly (Mass.) was elected a non-resident member of the Society.

VIENNA PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Second Quarter, 1932

April 6, 1932. Dr. Geza Roheim: 'Civilization and Ontogenesis'.

April 21, 1932. (1) Short communication: Dr. E. Hitschmann: 'Additional Notes on the Interpretation of Dreams'.

(2) Professor Freud's circular letter on the subject of the situation of the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag was discussed and the following resolution moved by Dr. Federn: 'The Vienna Psycho-Analytical

Society realizes the importance of Professor Freud's intimation and recognizes its obligation to do all in its power to comply with the request of its President. Members have been co-opted to the Council to form a special committee, whose duty it will be to make appropriate proposals to the whole society both as regards the task of the Vienna Society and the resolutions to be framed for the Congress on this subject '.

May 4, 1932. *Short communications :*

1. Dr. Yrjö Kulövesi : ' Instinctual Gratification in Epileptic Fits '.
2. Dr. Sperling : ' Shylock '.
3. Dr. Bychowski : An account of the situation of psycho-analysts in Warsaw.
4. Dorothy Burlingham (guest of the Society) : ' Observation of a Child at Play '.

May 18, 1932. Dr. Jssaeff (guest of the Society) : ' Fundamental Concepts in Sociology and Psycho-Analysis '.

Anna Freud,
Secretary.

II. Reports of the International Training Commission

BERLIN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL INSTITUTE

Second Quarter, 1932

(*a*) *Lecture Courses*

1. Dr. Otto Fenichel : Theory of the Specific Neuroses. Part I. 7 lectures. (Attendance 24.)
2. Dr. Hanns Sachs : Artistic Work and Group-formation. 3 lectures.
3. Dr. Jeanne Lampl-de Groot : The pre-Œdipal Phase. 3 lectures. (Attendance 29.)
4. Dr. Karen Horney : Manifestations and Problems of Homosexuality in Women. 3 lectures. (Attendance 34.)

(*b*) *Seminars. Practical Exercises. Discussions*

5. Dr. Otto Fenichel : Seminar on the works of Freud : case-histories. Part II. (7 seminars of two hours each. Attendance 34.)
6. Dr. Ernst Simmel : Practical seminars on the art of interpretation and symbolism. (4 seminars of two hours each. Attendance 16.)
7. Dr. Wilhelm Reich : Seminar on the works of Freud : writings on technique. (5 seminars of two hours each. Attendance 20.)
8. Dr. Horney and Dr. Müller-Braunschweig : Seminars on technique. (Alternate weeks.)
9. Dr. Müller-Braunschweig : Seminars on technique. (Discussion of children's analyses.) (Alternate weeks. Attendance 13.)
10. Dr. Sachs and Dr. Fenichel : Discussion of recent publications. (Alternate weeks. Attendance 48.)

11. Dr. Eitingon and others : Practical therapeutic exercises.
12. Dr. S. Bernfeld : Practical problems of psycho-analytical pedagogy. (7 sessions. Attendance 32.)

(*c*) *Study Circle*

13. Educational Study Circle. (Alternate weeks. Attendance 38.)

INSTITUTE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS, LONDON

Second Quarter, 1932

Lecture Course : Dr. Susan Isaacs : The Contribution of Psycho-Analysis to Anthropology.

Technical and Theoretical Seminars (as usual).

TRAINING INSTITUTE OF THE HUNGARIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Second Quarter, 1932

(*a*) *Single Lectures*

1. Dr. S. Ferenczi : The Psycho-Analytical Conception of the Structure of the Mind.
2. Dr. I. Hermann : The Sense of Shame and the Consciousness of Guilt.
3. Dr. M. Bálint : The Formation of Character.
(Attendance at the three lectures about 50.)

(*b*) *Lecture Courses*

4. Dr. Zs. Pfeifer : Clinical notes on Sexuality. (5 lectures. Attendance 25.)
5. Dr. L. Révész : Psycho-Analysis and Organic Disease. (4 lectures. Attendance 20.)
6. Dr. M. J. Eisler : Psycho-Analysis and Art. (2 lectures. Attendance 15.)

(*c*) *Seminars*

7. Frau V. Kovács : Seminars on technique. (For training candidates only.) (5 sessions. Attendance 9.)
8. Dr. I. Hermann : Seminars on theory. (For training candidates only.) (4 sessions. Attendance 9.)
9. Dr. G. Róheim : Seminars on ethnology. (6 sessions. Attendance 3.)

TRAINING INSTITUTE OF THE VIENNA PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Second Quarter, 1932

(*a*) *Lecture Courses*

1. Dr. E. Bibring : Introduction to the Theoretical Works of Freud. (4 lectures.)

2. Dr. Helene Deutsch : Psycho-Analytical problems of Female Sexuality.
3. Dr. P. Federn : Psycho-Analytic Technique. (4 lectures.)
4. Dr. R. Wälder : Freud's *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst.*

(*b*) *Seminars*

5. Dr. E. Bibring and Dr. H. Hartmann : Fundamental problems of psycho-analysis. (Weekly.)
6. Anna Freud : Seminar on the technique of the analysis of children. (Weekly.)
7. Dr. E. Hitschmann : Seminar on psycho-analytic therapy. (Fortnightly.)
8. Dr. L. Jekels : Reading and discussion of selected writings by Freud (For members of the Academic Union for Medical Psychology.)

(*c*) *Study Circles*

9. Dr. Helene Deutsch : Group control-analyses. (Weekly.)

(*d*) *Pedagogy*

10. A. Aichhorn : Practical talks on psycho-analytical pedagogy : asocial tendencies and intractability. (Weekly.)
11. Dr. W. Hoffer : Seminar for educationists. (Fortnightly.)

Library.

RÓHEIM AUSTRALASIAN RESEARCH NUMBER

VOL. XIII JANUARY—APRIL 1932 PARTS 1 & 2

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

DIRECTED BY
SIGM. FREUD

OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE
INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

EDITED BY
ERNEST JONES

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF

G. BOSE, CALCUTTA
A. A. BRILL, NEW YORK
D. BRYAN, LONDON
M. EITINGON, BERLIN
J. VAN EMDEN, THE HAGUE
S. FERENCZI, BUDAPEST
J. C. FLÜGEL, LONDON
J. W. KANNABICH, MOSCOW
C. P. OBERNDORF, NEW YORK
P. SARASIN, BÂLE
W. A. WHITE, WASHINGTON

PUBLISHED FOR
THE INSTITUTE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS
BY
BAILLIÈRE, TINDALL & COX, 7 & 8 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN,
LONDON, W.C. 2

THE
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS
is issued quarterly. Besides Original Papers, Abstracts and Reviews, it contains the Bulletin of the International Psycho-Analytical Association, of which it is the Official Organ.

NOTICES

EDITORIAL

1. Manuscripts and editorial communications should be sent to Dr. Ernest Jones, 81 Harley Street, London, W. 1.

2. Correspondence relating to translations should be addressed to the Translation Editor, Mrs. Joan Riviere, 3 Stanhope Terrace, Lancaster Gate, London, W. 2.

3. Manuscripts should be type-written, and a copy should always be retained by the author.

4. Authors will understand that translations of their articles may be published in the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse* or *Imago* if thought suitable.

5. Authors of original papers will be sent free of charge six copies of the Journal by the Publishers on application. If they require reprints at their own cost application should be made to the Publishers stating how many are required.

6. All matter appearing in this Journal is copyright.

ADMINISTRATIVE

1. The Annual Subscription is 30s. per Volume of Four Parts (America, $7.50 per Volume).

2. The journal is obtainable *by subscription only*, the parts not being sold separately.

3. Subscriptions and Correspondence relative to advertising and administrative matters in general should be addressed to the Publishers, Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 7 & 8 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C. 2.

4. Back volumes, Nos. I to XII, are available. Price in parts 30s., bound 40s., plus postage in each case, inland 9*d*., abroad 1s. 6*d*. Binding cases are also sold separately, price 6s. 3*d*. post free.

CONTENTS *(continued)*

BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

	PAGE
ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE	260
SIXTIETH BIRTHDAY OF JOSEF K. FRIEDJUNG	260
SIXTIETH BIRTHDAY OF EDWARD HITSCHMANN	261
DR. PAUL FEDERN	264
AMERICAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION	264
BRITISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY	265
DUTCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY	266
FRENCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY	266
GERMAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY	267
HUNGARIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY	268
INDIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY	268
NEW YORK PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY	271
SWISS PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY	272
VIENNA PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY	272
REPORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COMMISSION	273
BERLIN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL INSTITUTE	273
TRAINING INSTITUTE OF THE HUNGARIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY	274
INSTITUTE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS, LONDON	274
NEW YORK PSYCHO-ANALYTIC INSTITUTE	274
VIENNA TRAINING INSTITUTE	275

Wanted to Purchase.

PART 1, VOL. X. PART 3, VOL. VIII.
PARTS 3 & 4, VOL IX.
OF THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

Will anyone having copies to dispose of kindly communicate with the Publishers,
BAILLIÈRE, TINDALL & COX, 7 & 8 HENRIETTA STREET, LONDON, W.C. 2

Demy 8vo. Pp. xviii + 280. Price **10s. 6d.** Postage 6d. extra.

TWO ESSAYS ON ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

By C. G. JUNG, M.D., LL.D.
Authorized Translation by H. G. and C. F. BAYNES
First Essay.—The Unconscious in the Normal and Pathological Mind.
Second Essay.—The Relation of the Ego to the Unconscious.

BAILLIÈRE, TINDALL & COX, 7 & 8, HENRIETTA STREET, LONDON, W.C.2

CONTENTS

ORIGINAL PAPERS

GÉZA RÓHEIM. PSYCHO-ANALYSIS OF PRIMITIVE CULTURAL TYPES.

CHAP.		PAGE
I.	Introduction	2
II.	Psycho-Analytic Technique and Field Anthropology	6
III.	Children of the Desert	23
IV.	Sexual Life in Central Australia	38
V.	Totemic Ritual	57
VI.	The Psychology of the Central Australian Culture Area	74
VII.	Tauhau and the Mwadare	121
VIII.	Doketa	151
IX.	Super-Ego and Group-Ideal	175
X.	The National Character of the Somali	199
	Glossary	222

BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE NIGHTMARE. By Ernest Jones 225

THE MEANING OF PSYCHOANALYSIS. By Martin W. Peck 231

CINCO LIÇÕES DE PSICANALISE. By Sigm. Freud 231

FORTSCHRITTE DER SEXUALWISSENSCHAFT UND PSYCH-ANALYSE. IV. BAND. By Herausgegeben von Dr. Wilhelm Stekel ... 232

INVENTION AND THE UNCONSCIOUS. By Joseph-Marie Montmasson 232

PSYCHOLOGIE. By Von Harald K. Schjelderup 233

THE MIND IN CONFLICT. By R. A. Howden 234

INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY AND SEXUAL DIFFICULTIES. By Various Writers 235

INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY, MEDICINE, AND THE BASES OF SCIENCE. By F. G. Crookshank 235

RECENT ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF THE PSYCHONEUROSES. By Millais Culpin 235

SEX HOSTILITY IN MARRIAGE. By Th. H. Van de Velde 240

SEXUAL LIFE IN ANCIENT GREECE. By Hans Licht 241

THE SEXUAL LIFE OF MAN. By Dr. Placzek 241

EDUCATION OF THE BACKWARD CHILD. By David Kennedy-Fraser 242

CLINICAL NOTES ON DISORDERS OF CHILDHOOD. By D. W. Winnicott 242

A CHANGING PSYCHOLOGY IN SOCIAL CASE WORK. By Virginia P. Robinson 243

WITCHCRAFT, MAGIC AND ALCHEMY. By Grillot de Givry 244

REPORT

A TEN YEARS' REPORT OF THE VIENNA PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL CLINIC 245

(continued on previous page)

Printed in Great Britain by
The Whitefriars Press Ltd.,
London and Tonbridge.